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DISCOUNTS AND BUYOUTS IN MINORITY
INVESTOR LLC VALUATION DISPUTES
INVOLVING OPPRESSION OR DIVORCE
Sandra K. Miller*
This paper highlights the need for guidance on how to value a
minority LLC interest in a court-ordered buyout resulting from the exercise
of LLC dissenters’ rights, an oppression suit, or an action seeking an
equitable distribution of property in a divorce. The Model Business
Corporation Act prohibits both the “minority discount” reflecting the
minority’s lack of voting control and the “marketability discount”
adjusting for the limited illiquid market of a private firm. The American
Law Institute in the Principles of Corporate Governance and the Uniform
Partnership Act recommend disregarding the minority discount and the
marketability discount as a general rule, but recognize limited exceptions
for the marketability discount. This paper advances arguments in favor of
prohibiting both discounts in the valuation of an LLC. A contextual
judicial approach to valuation is recommended as are amendments to the
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and state LLC statutes in
order to authorize an election in lieu of a judicial dissolution to foster fair
and speedy resolutions of member conflicts.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The question of whether there has been unfairly prejudicial or
oppressive conduct on the part of a majority LLC member is just the first
issue that courts must address in resolving a dispute among warring LLC
members.1 Frequently, a court-ordered buyout will be the most appropriate

* Professor, J.D., LL.M. Phd, Department of Economics, Finance, and Taxation,
Widener University School of Business Administration. The author thanks Harry
Haynesworth IV, Chair of the Committee on Business Entity Harmonization; Douglas Moll,
Professor, University of Houston Law Center; and Richard J. Thomas, CPA and Director of
Certified Valuation for Elko & Associates, for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of
this article. The author also thanks Nicole Philips for her excellent research assistance.
1. See generally F. HODGE O‘NEAL & ROBERT THOMPSON, F. HODGE O‘NEAL &
THOMPSON‘S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS (2d ed. 2010)
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remedy. Very quickly the conflict can shift from whether the minority
should be bought out to what amount the minority should be paid.2 What
guidelines should be established for determining the buyout price in the
absence of a controlling LLC agreement? Should the buyout price be
adjusted downward to reflect the facts that a minority interest lacks voting
control and that the company is private rather than public with a limited
number of buyers?3
Assume, for example, that a 75% majority owner squeezes out the
25% minority member after the minority has a conflict with the majority
owner‘s son. Stripped of his role in management, and facing a dramatic
reduction in salary and distributions, the minority owner institutes a suit
alleging that the majority has engaged in oppressive conduct. Assuming
(providing an overview of legal issues affecting minority investors in private companies).
See also JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS (2d ed.
2003) (offering a review of legal issues concerning public and private corporations);
ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS (West Publishing 2006) (providing a detailed analysis of
the vulnerability of minority owners in private firms and squeeze-out problems).
2. A number of corporate statutes facilitate buyouts by containing an election to
purchase the corporation‘s stock in which case the petition for dissolution of the corporation
will be dismissed. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (2006) (describing election to
purchase in lieu of dissolution); infra Appendix E (providing a multi-state chart of
corporate, partnership, and LLC statutes that provide guidelines for the judicial dissolution).
States that offer express statutory buyout guidelines for corporations include Alaska,
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. A much smaller number of states provide such
guidelines in their LLC statutes. LLC statutes with buyout guidelines include California,
Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Utah. Virtually all states have some language in
their partnership statutes authorizing buyouts. See Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness
of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 25, 53 (1987) (presenting an empirical study of thirty-seven suits for a judicial
dissolution and finding that a majority culminated in a court-ordered buyout).
3. The minority discount provides a downward adjustment in value to reflect the fact
that the owner of a minority interest in the LLC lacks majority control to influence the
firm‘s affairs. A discount in marketability offers a downward adjustment to reflect the fact
that there is not a ready market on which to sell the interests in an LLC. See SHANNON P.
PRATT, ROBERT F. REILLY, & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS
AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 298-365 (3rd ed. 1996) (discussing minority
interest discounts, control premiums, and other discounts including the lack of marketability
discount). See also Bernier v. Bernier, 873 N.E. 2d 216, 222-224 (Mass. 2007) (considering
discrepancies in value due to discounts and distinguishing fair value from fair market
value); Marsh v. Billington Farms, LLC, C.A. No. PB 04-3123, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS
105, at *12-13 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2007) (concluding without discussing that the pro
rata valuation approach should be taken to a buyout of an LLC interest as the result of
oppressive conduct); Douglas Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of
Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 54 DUKE L. REV. 293, 297
(2004) (discussing the valuation issues in the context of disputes between shareholders of
closely-held companies).
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that the court decides not to liquidate the business, but to order the majority
to buy out the minority interest, how should the court determine the buyout
price absent a contractual arrangement? Should the buyout price be based
upon a strict 25% of value of the LLC? Alternatively should the price be
less than 25% of the company to reflect the minority‘s lack of voting
control? Arguably a ―willing‖ buyer would pay a ―willing‖ seller less than
this full 25% and would want the price to reflect a ―minority discount.‖
Should the buyout price be reduced to reflect the lack of a ready market for
such private companies? Does it make a difference if this is not a ―willing‖
sale?4 Should fault matter? Does the context matter? Should a different
result occur if the valuation is being done in connection with a divorce?
What if minority oppression is not involved but instead, the minority
opportunistically uses a relatively insignificant reorganizational change as a
pretext for triggering statutory dissenters‘ rights? Should the interests of
third parties in the continuing financial viability of the LLC be factored
into the buyout terms? What if the payment terms would strip the business
of its working capital? What are the social and/or economic policy
interests at stake?
As LLC filings soar, courts and arbitrators will have to make these
difficult decisions with increasing frequency.5 The LLC valuation
questions will emerge as questions of first impression as courts struggle to
interpret statutory and judicial corporate and/or partnership precedents for
guidance. The trouble is that most LLC statutes fail to provide guidance on
valuation approaches, and there are subtle conflicts in the messages sent
from the corporate and partnership arenas. While the Model Business
Corporation Act broadly prohibits both the ―minority discount‖ and the
―marketability discount‖ in the definition of ―fair value‖ governing the
purchase in lieu of a judicial dissolution,6 the Principles of Corporate
Governance7 and the Uniform Partnership Act8 acknowledge the possibility
4. See Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (indicating that the
dissenting shareholder is entitled to be paid ―that which has been taken from him, viz, his
proportionate interest in a going concern.‖).
5. See Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (or at Least Understand Why You
Should): Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce
Oppression in Closely-Held Businesses? 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 496-97 (2009)
(suggesting special steps to educate owners of small LLCs and to compile statistical data on
the contractual choices made by LLC owners).
6. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (2006) (authorizing a buyout in lieu of a
judicial dissolution); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4) at 13-3 (1998) (providing
guidelines for determining fair value defined as ―the value of the corporation‘s shares . . .
using customary and current valuation concepts . . . without discounting for lack of
marketability or minority status‖). See also Brown v. Arp. & Hammond Hardware Co., 141
P.3d 673, 684-685 (Wyo. 2006) (offering a superb history of the valuation guidelines
contained in the Model Business Corporation Act).
7. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
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of exceptions for the marketability discount in extraordinary circumstances.
The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA) has a
judicial dissolution provision, but one that does not contain guidelines on
buyouts in lieu of dissolutions.9 Should RULLCA be amended to include
such guidance, and if so, how should the minority and marketability
discount issues be addressed? Recent literature has focused upon the
appropriate methodology for determining the value of a corporation as a
whole, but not on the next question of whether minority and marketability
discounts should apply once the underlying value of the entity is
determined, particularly where the entity is an LLC.10
Following introductory comments in Part I and II, Part III considers
the LLC statutory buy-out provisions. Part IV discusses the corporate and
partnership case law dealing with the minority discount, the corporate and
partnership precedents regarding the marketability discount, and the
emerging LLC case law addressing both types of discounts. Arguing for a
contextual approach, Part V explores the policy interests at stake in LLC
oppression and dissenters‘ rights cases, many of which are shared by
corporations and other business entities. Consistent with both the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act and the Principles of Corporate Governance, this
paper supports a general rule prohibiting the minority and marketability
discounts in LLC oppression and dissenters‘ rights cases and in connection
with divorce. Part VI recommends that the Revised Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act be amended to provide a purchase in lieu of a

STANDARD FOR DETERMINING FAIR VALUE § 7.22 (2010) (defining that fair value should be
calculated as the eligible holder‘s proportionate interest in the corporation without any
discount for lack of marketability, ―absent extraordinary circumstances‖).
8. See UNIF. P‘SHIP ACT § 7.01(b), cmt. no. 3 (1997) (discussing that while ―[t]he
notion of a minority discount in determining the buyout price is negated by valuing the
business as a going concern . . . [o]ther discounts, such as for a lack of marketability . . .
may be appropriate . . . .‖).
9. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701 (2006) (providing for a judicial
dissolution or other remedies in the event of illegal, fraudulent or oppressive conduct, but
not containing an express provision for a buyout in lieu of a dissolution with guidance on
how the buyout price should be determined).
10. See Steven G. (Buzz) Durio, Discounts in Business Valuations After Cannon v.
Bertrand, 57 LA. BAR J. 24, 27-28 (2009) (observing that where a partner withdraws from a
partnership and the partnership continues and the remaining partners have an equal say or
where an LLC member withdraws and the remaining LLC continues, a convincing argument
can be made that the minority discount should not apply); Lawrence A. Hamermesh &
Michael L. Wachter, Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 1021, 1022 (2009) (endorsing Delaware‘s determination of a corporation‘s ―fair
value‖ as going concern value under the corporate appraisal statute but not addressing the
debate regarding the minority and marketability discounts arising in buyouts of small private
partnerships or LLCs); Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Texas Close
Corporations: Majority Rule (Still) Isn’t What It Used to Be, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 33,
60 (2008) (discussing valuation issues for small private firms).
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judicial dissolution with a general prohibition on minority and
marketability discounts.
II.

THE DISCOUNTS, THE PRO RATA APPROACH, AND THE VARIABLE
NATURE OF LLC INTERESTS

To properly value an LLC interest in a judicial buy-out, it is essential
to understand the nature of the discounts, the unique features of the LLC,
the competing valuation approaches, and the relevant LLC, corporate, and
partnership statutory environments. Part A below explores the different
discounts. Also, it discusses the corporate-style pro rata approach to
valuation. Part B discusses the hybrid features of the LLC and the unique
contractual nature of the LLC interest.
A.

“Fair Market Value,” “Fair Value,” and Discounts

Courts have largely defined ―fair market value‖ as the price that a
willing buyer would pay a willing seller in the relevant marketplace with
neither being under a compulsion to enter into the sale.11 In the context of a
purchase of stock, for instance, the ―fair market value‖ would be the
owner‘s proportionate interest in the corporation multiplied by the value of
the corporation, plus or minus any premiums or discounts that would be
reflected in the market.12 Thus, the ―fair market value‖ of the interest
owned by a 25% stockholder of a company worth $1,000,000 would be
$250,000 plus or minus any relevant premiums or discounts that take into
account special aspects of the seller‘s particular shares. In contrast, ―fair
value‖ does not consider market-related factors that could affect value in
the particular hands of a specific owner. Instead, ―fair value‖ considers
only ―the proportionate interest in a going concern.‖13 Thus, one need
11. See First W. Bank Wall v. Olsen, 2001 SD 16, 621 N.W. 2d 611 (explaining that,
with respect to a valuation dispute in the context of the exercise of dissenters‘ rights,
―[i]nitially, it bears repeating that we are bound by what the legislature has written‖ (citing
State Subsequent Injury Fund v. Federated Mut. Ins., Inc., 2000 SD 11, 605 N.W.2d 166,
169)). ―If the legislature intended dissenting shareholders to receive the fair market value of
their shares, it would have so stated. The reason the legislature did not use the term fair
market value is obvious. Fair market value has often been defined as the price a willing
buyer would pay a willing seller, both under no obligation to act.‖ First W. Bank Wall, 621
N.W. 2d at 617 (citing Zochert v. Nat‘l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas., 1998 SD 34, 576
N.W.2d 531, 534). See also Rev. Rul. 59-60 1959-1 C.B. 237 (discussing the IRS‘
definition of ―fair market value‖ as the price that a willing buyer will pay a willing seller,
neither being under a compulsion to sell, and both having a reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts).
12. Moll, supra note 3, at 296-97.
13. Id. See also Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., Inc., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477, 486
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to devalue the corporation for a minority discount);
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establish only the value of the company and the ownership percentage—
$1,000,000 times 25% without considering any special market adjustments
that might come into play in the hands of the stockholder.
There are many different types of discounts recognized by valuation
experts. There is a discount for voting versus nonvoting minority shares.14
Discounts are recognized for the loss of a key person, known as the ―Key
Person‖ discount.15 Discounts have been recognized for fractional interests
in real estate. One study for instance covered the sales of 54 undivided
interests in real estate and revealed a median discount of 30 percent.16 The
most common discounts that arise in the context of controversies involving
closely-held business disputes include the minority discount and the lack of
marketability discount.
1.

The Minority Discount

The minority discount takes into account the fact that the minority
interest holder lacks majority control.17
In valuing privately-held
Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, 63 P.3d 353, 362 (Colo. 2003) (discussing that the fact
that the legislature has required dissenters be paid both ―value‖ and ―fair value,‖ but never
―fair market value‖); Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d 1137, 1144-45 (Del. 1989) (refusing to
recognize the minority and marketability discounts in an action under Delaware‘s appraisal
statute); Security State Bank v. Ziegeldorf, 554 N.W. 2d 884, 889-90 (Iowa 1996)
(eschewing minority and marketability discounts); Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank of
Ashland Kansas, 992 P. 2d 216, 220-21 (Kan. 1999) (disregarding the marketability and
minority discount); Fisher v. Fisher, 568 N.W. 2d 728, 731-32 (N.D. 1997) (refusing to
apply minority discount in a divorce setting); Charland v. Country View Golf Club, Inc.,
588 A. 2d 609, 613 (R.I. 1991) (disallowing the minority and marketability discounts in a
dissolution); First W. Bank Wall, 621 N.W. 2d at 617-18 (involving a valuation dispute in
the context of the exercise of dissenters‘ rights); Hogle v. Zinetics Medi. Inc., 63 P. 3d 80,
84 (Utah 2002) (discounts are inherently unfair to a minority shareholder who is not a
willing seller); HMO-W Inc. v. SSM Health Care Sys., 611 N.W. 2d 250, 255 (Wis. 2000)
(disallowing minority discount in an appraisal). But see Blake v. Blake, 486 N.Y.S. 2d 341,
349-50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (concluding that ―fair value‖ encompasses a discount for the
private nature of the company—the ―marketability discount,‖ but not a ―minority discount‖
reflecting the owner‘s lack of control in a company). See also Munshower v. Kolbenheyer,
732 So. 2d 385, 386-387 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (following New York‘s approach to
defining ―fair value‖ to disregard the minority discount but to consider a marketability
discount).
14. See SHANNON P. PRATT, ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, VALUING A
BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES, 323-24 (5th ed.
2008) [hereinafter PRATT ET AL. 5th ed.].
15. Id.
16. Id. at 322-23.
17. See Rebecca C. Cavendish & Christopher W. Kammerer, Determining the Fair
Value of Minority Ownership Interests in Closely Held Corporations: Are Discounts for
Lack of Control and Lack of Marketability Applicable? 82 FLA. B.J. 10, 11-12 (2008),
available
at
http://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/0/e6c13ab725ca5ed6852573db006eaab
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businesses, there may be considerable differences in the value of ownership
interests that offer different degrees of control in the business.18 A number
of elements impact the investor‘s nature and degree of control and may
ultimately affect the value of the investor‘s interest. These elements of
control include the capacity to:
1. Appoint management.
2. Determine management compensation and perquisites.
3. Set policy and change the course of business.
4. Acquire or liquidate assets.
5. Select people with whom to do business and award
contracts.
6. Make acquisitions.
7. Liquidate, dissolve, sell out, or recapitalize the company.
8. Sell or acquire treasury shares.
9. Register the company‘s stock for a public offering.
10. Declare and pay dividends.
11. Change the articles of incorporation.
12. Block any of the above actions.19
Given the nature and scope of majority control, it is readily apparent
that the owner of a controlling interest in an enterprise enjoys some very
valuable rights that the minority owner does not possess.20 However, there
is not a great deal of documentation regarding the existence and degree of
minority discounts. The rarity and possible difficulty of selling a minority
interest on its own was documented in one study by a bank trust officer
who administered trusts and estates that owned some or all of the interests
in closely held businesses.21 The officer conducted two major studies of
minority discounts.22 The first was comprised of data on 30 actual sales of
minority interests. The officer‘s data revealed that the average sale was
36% below book value and only 20% of the sales were made at discounts
less than 20%. More than half of the sales were made at discounts ranging
from 22% and 48%.23 Approximately 23 ½ percent of the sales were made
at discounts from 54.4% to 78%.24 The second study also found substantial
discounts. It should be noted, however, that the discounts were from book
value (rather than enterprise value), but discounts from enterprise value
6?opendocument (discussing the challenges of valuing a business interest where majority
control is lacking and reviewing Florida‘s unusual statutory approach of prohibiting
discounts for closely held corporations that have 10 shareholders or less).
18. PRATT ET AL. 5th ed., supra note 14, at 323-24.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 321.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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would have produced even greater discounts.25 Clearly, one or two studies
are far from definitive. What evidence does exist, however, leads one to
believe that the minority discount is a very real market phenomenon.
2.

The Marketability Discount

The marketability discount takes into account the fact that there is not
a ready market for a privately-held company.26 As a result, the owners of a
private company that seek to sell the firm will face a number of costs not
encountered by the public firm.27 One valuation expert has described these
costs as follows:
The controlling owner of a closely held company who wishes to
liquidate a controlling equity interest generally faces the following
transactional considerations:
1. Uncertain time horizon to complete offering or sale.
2. Cost to prepare for and execute offering or sale.
3. Risk as to eventual price.
4. Form of transaction proceeds.
5. Inability to hypothecate.28
Given these transactional considerations, the value of a private
company may be less than that of its publicly-traded counterpart since the
illiquidity carries with it additional risks.29 However, as discussed below,
the impact of the lack of marketability will be felt only if the company is
sold. Although a majority of courts now reject both the minority and
marketability discounts, some courts in Florida30 and New York,31 have

25. Id. at 322.
26. Id. at 350-51.
27. See Mukesh Bajaj et al., Firm Value and Marketability Discounts, 27 J. CORP. L. 89,
92-93 (2001) (discussing restrictions from selling an asset which causes the investor to
forego the ability to sell at a maximum price).
28. PRATT ET AL. 5th ed., supra note 14, at 350-51.
29. Id.
30. Munshower v. Kolbenheyer, 732 So. 2d 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding
the marketability discount but providing little analysis, and not containing a discussion of
the minority discount). It should be noted that this decision was reached prior to Florida‘s
statutory changes prohibiting the minority and marketability discounts in corporations with
ten or fewer shareholders. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1430 (2010) (expressly disregarding
minority and marketability discounts for corporations with ten or fewer shareholders but
remaining silent with regard to larger corporations). See also FLA. STAT. § 608.4351(5)
(2010) (expressly disregarding minority or marketability discounts for LLCs with ten or
fewer members).
31. See In re Murphy, 903 N.Y.S.2d 434, 437-38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (applying a
15% marketability discount in a corporate purchase in lieu of a dissolution); Blake v. Blake
Agency, 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (allowing a discount for lack of
marketability where the marketability discount was applied to the goodwill of the company);
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rejected the minority discount but permit the discount for the lack of
marketability. For example, some decisions in New York have rejected the
minority discount but have applied the marketability discount.32 These
New York decisions have reasoned that the marketability discount is
appropriate to accurately reflect the lesser value of shares that cannot be
freely traded like the shares of public companies.33 As one court recently

In re Jamaica Acquisition, Inc., 901 N.Y.S.2d 907, at *17-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (applying
a marketability discount); Peter A. Mahler, Ruling on Valuation Discounts for
Marketability, Built-In Gains Tax Ends Rift Among New York Appellate Courts, N.Y.
BUSINESS DIVORCE (June 7, 2010), http://www.nybusinessdivorce.com/2010/06/articles/
valuation-discounts/ruling-on-valuation-discounts-for-marketability-builtin-gains-tax-endsrift-among-new-york-appellate-courts/ (discussing Matter of Murphy and observing that the
Nassau County Commercial Division opinion had applied a 15% marketability discount to
the value of the enterprise as a whole thereby rejecting precedents that had previously
applied the marketability discount only to the goodwill of the company). See also Mohlas
Realty, LLC v. Koutelos, No. 5799/08, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2009) (involving an
answer asserting a 30% lack of marketability discount); In re Murphy, No. 002640/2006,
slip op. at 23-28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2008) (indicating that the court is powerless to
reject case law that has considered a lack of marketability discount). In Hall v. King, 675
N.Y.S.2d 810, 814-16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998), a N.Y. Supreme Court applied the
marketability discount to the enterprise as a whole and not just to its goodwill. The decision
in Hall indicates that although there are some cases that have applied the marketability
discount just to goodwill the better approach is to apply the marketability discount to the
company as a whole, thus disagreeing with prior applications of the discount to goodwill
only in Whalen v. Whalen’s Moving & Storage Co., 612 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1996) and in Matter of Cinque v. Largo Enterprises, 212 A.D.2d 608, 610 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995). More recently, the Supreme Court of New York, Nassau County, observed that
―upon a fair ready of Whalen and Cinique, the court is left without a reason for the rulings
vis-à-vis goodwill v. other assets of an enterprise‖ and upheld the application of the
marketability discount to the entire enterprise. In re Jamaica Acquisition Inc., 901 N.Y.S.2d
at *16-18.
32. See Raskin v. Karl, 514 N.Y.S.2d 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (applying the
marketability discount in the context of a corporation dissolution case).
33. Blake v. Blake Agency, 107 A.D.2d 139, 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (applying a
marketability discount). But see Charland v. Country View Golf Club, 588 A.2d 609, 61213 (R.I. 1991) (refusing to apply minority discount or lack of marketability discount in an
oppression suit). In New Jersey, courts have sometimes rejected both the minority and
marketability discount. See Wheaton v. Smith, 734 A.2d 738, 750-51 (N.J. 1999)
(observing that in appraisal actions the marketability discount should generally not apply
and finding no extraordinary circumstances that would justify the discount where the
dissenting shareholders had exercised their appraisal rights because they lacked confidence
in new management). See also Balsamides v. Protameen Chems. Inc., 734 A.2d 721 (N.J.
1999) (recognizing the lack of marketability discount in extraordinary circumstances where
there was a feud between two owners of a corporation and considerations of equity justified
the marketability discount). Though decided the same day as Wheaton, because of the
unusual facts, the court ordered one fifty-percent owner to buy out the other owner, who had
engaged in oppressive conduct. Subsequently, a N.J. appellate court refused to find
extraordinary circumstances justifying a marketability discount in connection with a divorce
in the valuation of the husband‘s minority ownership of a family florist where there was no
evidence of a possible sale of the business, presumably making market considerations
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noted ―It is important to distinguish the minority discount and another
commonly discussed discount, the marketability discount, which adjusts for
a lack of liquidity.‖34 While denying a minority discount, an Oregon
appellate court reasoned that the marketability discount properly captured
the close corporation‘s volatility and illiquidity.35 In addition, some Florida
court decisions have acknowledged that a discount for marketability may
be appropriate in some cases.36
3.

The Key Man Discount

The Key Man Discount is a discount that adjusts the value of the
business downward for the loss of human capital.37 For example, in the
case of a firm whose goodwill is associated with one individual, the value

relevant. Brown v. Brown, 792 A.2d 463, 477-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
34. Brown v. Arp & Hammond Hardware, 141 P.3d 673, 679 (Wyo. 2006) (reversing
the lower court‘s application of a minority discount).
35. See Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 765 P.2d 207, 213-14 (Or. Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that a fair price for dissenting shareholder stock requires a market value
assessment). But see Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 926-27 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)
(refusing to apply a minority and marketability discount where there was misconduct by the
defendant).
36. See Cox Enterprises v. News-Journal Corporation, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1108-09
(M.D. Fla. 2006) (indicating that a discount for a lack of marketability is a qualifying
component of computing ―fair value.‖); Hall v. King, 675 N.Y.S.2d 810, 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1998) (indicating that, under the present facts, there was insufficient support for the
application of a discount). See also Erp v. Erp, 976 So. 2d 1234, 1239-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding that the court has discretion to apply a marketability discount in an
equitable distribution of marital assets in connection with a dissolution of marriage). The
Florida law regarding discounts has been in a state of flux, however, since the Florida
corporate appraisal statute dealing with dissenters‘ rights and the LLC provision dealing
with dissenters‘ rights were changed expressly to define ―fair value‖ to disregard the
minority and marketability in corporations or LLCs with ten or fewer shareholders or LLC
members. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1301, 1302 (2010) (expressly disregarding minority
and marketability discounts for corporations with ten or fewer shareholders but remaining
silent with regard to larger corporations in connection with corporate shareholders‘ appraisal
rights); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4351, 4352 (2010) (expressly disregarding minority and
marketability discounts for LLCs with ten or fewer members but remaining silent with
regard to larger LLCs in connection with LLC members‘ appraisal rights). Interestingly,
Florida‘s corporate judicial dissolution statute offers a buyout in lieu of a judicial
dissolution using the term ―fair value,‖ but it does not contain special provisions for small
corporations or any other guidance on the term ―fair value.‖ FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1436
(2010). Florida‘s LLC dissolution provision does not offer a buyout in lieu of dissolution
and thus offers no guidelines on valuation methodology that might apply in the specific
context of a judicially ordered buyout. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.449 (2010). See Cavendish &
Kammerer, supra note 17.
37. The seminal revenue ruling on business valuation addresses the key man discount.
See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (indicating that the loss of a key person can have a
depressing effect upon the value of a business).

MILLERFINALIZED_TWO (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

DISCOUNTS AND BUYOUTS

4/28/2011 7:33 PM

617

of the business might go down significantly if the individual leaves the
business. The Key Man Discount may be appropriate in a minority buyout
if the person seeking the buyout is also taking with her or him some
customers or clients.38
4.

The Pro Rata versus the Discount Approach

Under a pro rata approach, the buy-out price is based on the LLC
member‘s applicable ownership interest in the LLC. Thus, in the simplest
case, if an LLC member owning 75% of the LLC is ordered to buy out the
interests of the 25% member, the purchase price will be based upon 25% of
the value of the LLC in total. No reduction would be made to reflect the
fact that the 25% owner lacks control of the enterprise. Thus, if the LLC is
valued as a whole at $1,000,000, the buy-out price paid to the minority
LLC member would be $250,000. In contrast, an approach that recognizes
a minority discount would reduce the $250,000 by an amount that would
reflect the fact that a 25% owner lacks control of the LLC. The pro rata
approach assumes that all interests in the LLC are equal. Thus, it does not
take into account any contractual differences that may make some LLC
interests more or less valuable than others.
B.

The Unique Features of the LLC

The LLC offers unprecedented flexibility combined with favorable
flow-through taxation. The flexibility that has made the LLC so popular
has opened the door to richly varied LLC contractual relationships. LLC
members may have an interest in profits that differs from their interest in
the capital of the entity. Unlike S Corporation shareholders, each LLC
member may have a unique constellation of ownership interests. S
Corporation shareholders are required to have only a single class of stock
38. See Bernier v. Bernier, 873 N.E.2d 216, 231-33 (Mass. 2007) (denying a key man
discount under the present facts, but recognizing that a key man discount may be
appropriate where [a] an individual‘s continuing services are critical to the financial success
of the company, and [b] where the services would be lost). See also Hodas v. Spectrum
Tech., Inc., Civil Action No. 11,265, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 252, *13-15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7,
1992) (disallowing a marketability discount but allowing a key man discount where a
shareholder had personal contacts and a unique combination of skills and education). But
see Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., Inc., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477, 488-89 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (indicating that the goodwill that a controlling shareholder builds for the
corporation should stay with the corporation and that a devaluation because the controlling
shareholder could depart should not be considered). See generally William P. Dukes,
Business Valuation Basics for Attorneys, 1 J. BUS. VALUATION & ECON. LOSS ANALYSIS
(2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/jbvela/vol1/iss1/art7/ (discussing important
business valuation issues for attorneys including premiums, discounts, required return, and
capitalization rates).
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in order to qualify for favorable flow-through taxation.39 However, LLC
members are taxed as partnerships and, under the partnership tax rules,
LLC members may have widely divergent compensation arrangements and
varying interests in profits.40 Additionally, not all those with financial
rights in the LLC will be actual members of the LLC with members‘ rights.
For example, one who has acquired an interest in an LLC by inheritance
may be considered a transferee and not a member.41 The significance is
that a transferee normally does not have voting or other rights enjoyed by
LLC members; instead, the transferee merely has financial rights in the
LLC.42
Once the valuation expert, using one of several acceptable approaches
to valuing the entity, determines the value of the LLC as a whole, the
expert will then consider special adjustments such as contractual features or
other factors that might impact the value of the ownership rights being
transferred. The question of whether a minority and/or marketability
discount should be applied will arise where the member owns less than a
controlling interest in a privately-owned LLC. In answering these
questions, it is important to analyze each discount individually and to
carefully consider the statutory and factual context in which the valuation
question arises.
III. THE LLC STATUTORY ENVIRONMENT
A.

The LLC Statutes
The LLC statutes vary somewhat in their approaches to the judicial
dissolution remedy, but virtually all states have some statutory reference to
judicial dissolutions.43 Approximately twenty-five states provide for a
judicial dissolution in the event of deadlock, oppressive behavior, or other
stated misconduct.44 Approximately forty-four states, including some that
also have remedies for oppressive conduct, provide for judicial dissolution

39. I.R.C. § 1361 (2006).
40. See I.R.C. § 704(c) (2006) (providing for various allocations of losses subject to the
restriction that the allocations have a substantial economic effect).
41. See CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES:
TAX AND BUSINESS LAW § 8.06[2][a][i] (2010), available at Westlaw Limited Liab. Co. ¶
8.06 (explaining that transferees typically have no right to participate in management of an
LLC).
42. Id.
43. See infra Appendices B, C, and E. But see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-25-108 (2010)
(providing for an election for closely-held LLCs under which dissolution occurs only when
[a] the period fixed for the duration of the company expires, [b] by unanimous written
agreement of members, or [c] upon the occurrence of an event specified in the operating
agreement; thus offering no statutory authorization for judicial dissolution).
44. See infra Appendix B.
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on the grounds that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on business.45
Unlike many corporate statutes providing for judicial dissolution in
the event of deadlock, oppressive conduct, or other misconduct, most LLC
statutes do not provide for a purchase in lieu of a judicial dissolution. Most
of the LLC statutes authorize judicial dissolution for illegal, fraudulent, or
oppressive conduct, but they are silent with regard to the specific remedy of
a buy-out or its valuation methodology.46 Approximately forty-one LLC
statutes contain no express guidelines as to valuation in the event a judicial
dissolution is avoided by a court-ordered buy-out.47
The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act authorizes
judicial dissolution for illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct, but fails
to offer provisions for a buy-out in lieu of a dissolution or any related
valuation guidelines.48 In contrast, approximately twenty-two corporate
statutes provide for a purchase in lieu of a judicial dissolution pursuant to
the Model Business Corporation Act, most of which use the term ―fair
value‖ rather than ―fair market value‖ in designating how the buy-out
should proceed.49
The Delaware LLC statute authorizes judicial dissolution on the
grounds that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on business.50 A few
states do have LLC statutes that authorize a buy-out in lieu of dissolution.
For instance, California and Utah authorize a buy-out in lieu of dissolution
and specify that the valuation should be with reference to ―fair market
value.‖51 Under the California statute, if the parties cannot agree on the fair
market value, the court is required to appoint three appraisers who will
determine the valuation. The California and Utah statutes make no

45. See infra Appendix C.
46. See infra Appendices B and C.
47. See infra Appendix E.
48. REVISED
UNIF.
LTD.
LIAB.
CO.
ACT
§
701,
available
at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ullca/2006act_final.htm. As of Aug. 2010, this
has been enacted by Iowa, Nebraska, and Wyoming.
49. See infra Appendix E. See also infra Appendix D (containing the Model Business
Corporation‘s judicial dissolution provisions, which provide for a buy-out in lieu of a
judicial dissolution triggered in part by oppressive conduct).
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (2005). See Polak v. Kobayashi, No. Civ.A. 05330 JJF, 2005 WL 2008306 (D. Del. Aug. 22, 2005) (concluding that there was no
reasonably practicable way for the business to carry on where two attorneys had invested in
real estate and one had refused to communicate with the other and transfer title to real estate
from his own account to that of the LLC). See also In re Arrow Investment Advisors, LLC,
C.A. No. 4091-VCS, 2009 WL 1101682 (Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 2009) (refusing to grant
dissolution and expressing concern that the petitioner was planning to side-step fiduciary
duty claims and an arbitration agreement); In re Seneca Investments LLC, 970 A.2d 259,
263 (Del. Ch. 2008) (involving suit for dissolution where one of three directors was
removed).
51. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17351(b)(1)–(b) (3) (West 2006). See infra Appendix E.
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references to valuation methodologies specified in the articles of
organization. Also, the Utah statute does not offer any direction in terms of
the appointment of appraisers, but rather it authorizes the court to consider
whatever factors it deems appropriate.52
The Illinois LLC statute contains a buy-out provision in lieu of
dissolution and specifies that the valuation is to be based on ―fair value.‖53
In determining ―fair value,‖ the statute does not specify whether discounts
are to be considered, but it does require the court to consider relevant
evidence of going concern value, including agreements between the parties
that specify a formula, for valuing the interests. Pennsylvania provides for
a distribution based upon ―fair value‖ when a member disassociates from
the LLC; it also has a judicial dissolution provision that is tied to the ―not
reasonably practicable standard.‖54 Under Pennsylvania‘s LLC dissolution
provision, dissolution is triggered when it is no longer reasonably
practicable to carry on the business.55 However, specific guidance on
valuation in connection with judicial dissolution is not provided.
In addition, Minnesota and North Dakota provide for dissolution of
the LLC in lieu of a purchase.56 Minnesota‘s and North Dakota‘s buy-out
provisions are at ―fair value‖ and direct the court to use the value indicated
in the articles of organization unless the agreement is unreasonable under
the circumstances.57
In Tennessee, when the existence and the business of the LLC
continue but a member‘s interest has been terminated for certain specified
reasons (including when it is no longer practicable to do business with the
member) the member is entitled to receive the fair value of the terminated
membership interest.58 If the parties cannot agree upon fair value, the court
is authorized to determine fair value.59 The statute directs the court to
enforce governing terms in LLC documents that address fair value if the
value is to be determined by the LLC operating agreement.60 In addition,
the statute authorizes the imposition of attorney‘s fees, appraiser‘s fees, or

52. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1214(4) (LexisNexis 2007).
53. See infra Appendix E. See also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-60, 180/35-65
(West 2004).
54. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8933 (LexisNexis 2007) (addressing distributions upon
dissociation); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8972 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing for dissolution
when it is no longer practicable to carry on business).
55. Id.
56. See id. at app. E.
57. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.833 (West 2010). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 1032-119 (2008).
58. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-505(c) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-506
(2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-617 (2008).
59. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-506 (2010).
60. See id.
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other expenses of an expert if the party has not acted in good faith and has
not engaged in fair dealing.61
A minority of LLC statutes provide for dissenters‘ rights.62 For
example, Florida‘s LLC statute provides for an appraisal in the event of
certain mergers or conversions subject to modification, restriction, or
elimination by contract.63 The Florida LLC appraisal rights direct that the
minority and marketability discounts should be disregarded for LLCs with
ten or fewer members.64 No statutory guidance for buy-outs in connection
with appraisal rights is provided for the valuation of Florida LLCs with
more than ten members.65
As can be seen from the above summary and from Appendix E, most
LLC statutes do not contain clear statutory definitions and guidelines as to
the valuation of an LLC interest. As for the case law, although LLC
valuation case law is beginning to emerge, the majority of guidance must
be gleaned from judicial precedents in the corporate and partnership arenas.
IV. THE DISCOUNTS AND THE CASE LAW
Given the recent arrival of LLCs on the business entity landscape, it is
not surprising that most of the established case law on minority and
marketability discounts stems from the partnership and corporate settings.
In analyzing this authority, it is important to carefully consider the specific
statutory and factual contexts of the cases. Also, although some courts talk
about these discounts interchangeably, they are very different in nature.
A.

The Minority Discount and the Corporate and Partnership Contexts

Much of the judicial guidance on the minority and marketability
discounts has been decided in connection with dissenters‘ statutes. At
present, virtually all states have corporate dissenters‘ rights statutes, also
61. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-506(3)(B)(v) (2010).
62. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17604 (Deering 2010) (providing for dissenters‘ rights with
fair market value payment); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4352 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing for
appraisal rights subject to limitations); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-603(a) (2010); MINN. STAT.
§ 322B.386 (LexisNexis 2007) (using the term fair value); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-54
(2010) (using the term fair value); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.40-41 (LexisNexis 2010)
(using term fair cash value); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.430 (2010).
63. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4352 (LexisNexis 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4352(4)
(LexisNexis 2010).
64. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4351 (LexisNexis 2010).
65. Interestingly, the Florida LLC provision addressing judicial dissolutions contains no
express guidelines for valuations in a court-ordered buy-out in lieu of a judicial dissolution.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.449 (LexisNexis 2010). In contrast, the Florida corporate
judicial dissolution provisions provide for a ―fair value‖ buy-out in lieu of a judicial
dissolution. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.1430, 1434, 1436 (LexisNexis 2010).
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known as the appraisal remedy.66 Dissenters‘ rights give the minority
interest holder in a company the right to disapprove the proposed
fundamental change in the corporation such as where a major acquisition
results in a reorganization of the company that may be accompanied by a
change in management.67 The shareholders who dissent from the
transaction are entitled to receive the ―fair value‖ of their shares.68
Shareholders of private corporations as well as public companies may
utilize dissenters‘ rights and as indicated previously, a small number of
LLC statutes have enacted dissenters‘ rights.69 There can be some overlap
in situations giving rise to dissenters‘ rights and those justifying petitions
for a judicial dissolution—an attempted squeeze-out of a minority owner
may give rise to either action.70 However, the petition for judicial
dissolution typically occurs in the privately-owned corporation and may
encompass deadlocks among shareholders.71 Dissenters‘ rights may be
triggered by any number of disagreements with fundamental changes in the
enterprise and can occur in the context of public or private companies.72
The seminal case on minority discounts in the context of dissenters‘
rights is Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett73 in which the Delaware Supreme
Court rejected the application of a minority discount in connection with
Delaware‘s appraisal remedy.74 The Delaware appraisal statute does not
expressly eschew the minority discount, but the Delaware Supreme Court
66. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE at Pt. VII, ch. 4,
291-92, 296 (2007) (indicating that an ABA survey found that all jurisdictions have a statute
specifying events giving rise to appraisal rights). These statutes typically offer cash equal to
the ―fair value‖ of the minority‘s shares when there has been a major event has occurred
such as a merger, consolidation, mandatory sale of substantially all assets, etc. The statutes
emerged at about the time when American corporate law dropped the requirement that
unanimous shareholder approval was needed for mergers and other fundamental changes.
67. See id. at 7.21 cmt. c (elaborating upon five different triggering events including: 1)
business combinations; 2) squeeze-out transactions; 3) sale of substantial assets; 4) charter
amendments; and 5) events designated in corporate charter documents other than bylaws).
68. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2010) (providing for the determination of ―fair
value‖ for purposes of an appraisal proceeding). See also id. at app. E (listing of statutes
authorizing judicial dissolution and/or buyouts).
69. See; CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 17604 (Deering 2007) (providing for dissenters‘
rights with fair market value payment); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-603(a) (2007); MINN. STAT.
§ 322B.386 (West 2007) (using the term fair value); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-54 (2008)
(using the term fair value); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.40 & 1705.41 (LexisNexis 2008)
(using term fair cash value); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.430 (2010).
70. SANDRA K. MILLER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, § 7:1 (2009) (providing an
overview of unfairly prejudicial or oppressive conduct).
71. Id.
72. See generally F. HODGE O‘NEAL & ROBERT THOMPSON, O‘NEAL & THOMPSON‘S
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS, (2d ed. 2010) (providing an
overview of legal issues affecting minority investors in private companies).
73. 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
74. Id. at 1142.
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exposed the problems posed by the minority discount and began a national
trend away from minority discounts in the corporate contexts.75
In Cavalier Oil, the plaintiff, a minority shareholder, sought the ―fair
value‖ of his stock pursuant to Delaware‘s appraisal statute. As explained
by the court, the appraisal statute requires the shareholder who dissents
from a cash-out merger to receive the ―fair value‖ or intrinsic value of his
or her shares.76 The task of the court, in the words of Justice Walsh, is to
―value what has been taken from the shareholder: ‗viz his proportionate
interest in a going concern.‘‖77 The court concluded that the application of
a minority discount was contrary to the requirement that the company be
regarded as a going concern.78 Further, the court emphasized that the
appraisal process is not designed to reconstruct a pro forma sale.79 Thus,
the compensation to the dissenting investor is compensation for the
deprivation of an investment that the shareholder would have been willing
to maintain had the merger not occurred.80
The court articulated several major policy reasons for rejecting the
minority discount. First, it emphasized that discounting injects an
undesirable degree of speculation into the valuation process.81 Second, it
argued that discounting ends up penalizing the minority investor for his or
her lack of control.82 Third, the court pointed out that the minority discount
unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who may get a windfall by
cashing out the dissenting shareholder.83
Subsequent to Cavalier Oil, a majority of courts rejected the minority
discount in the context of dissenters‘ cases.84 The deterrence function of
75. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (2010).
76. Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1137.
77. Id. at 1144-45.
78. Id. 1145-46.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1145.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Foy v. Klapmeier, 992 F.2d 774, 781 (8th Cir. 1993); Pro Finish USA, Ltd v.
Johnson, 63 P.3d 288, 294 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box. Co. Inc.,
91 Cal. App.3d 477, 486-87 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Security State Bank v. Ziegeldorf,
554 N.W.2d 884, 889-90 (Iowa 1996); Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank, 992 P.2d 216,
220 (Kan. 1999); Hansen v. 75 Ranch Co. 957 P.2d 32, 42 (Mont. 1998); Rigel Corp. v.
Cutchall, 511 N.W.2d 519, 526 (Neb. 1989); Lawson Mardon Inc. v. Smith, 734 A.2d 738,
748 (N.J. 1999); Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972, 975 (N.Y. 1995); Woolf
v. Universal Fid. Life Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992); Charland v.
Country View Golf Club Inc., 588 A.2d 609, 613 (R.I. 1991); Stone v. People‘s Trust &
Sav. Bank, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1039 (S.D. Ind. 2005); Robblee v. Robblee, 841 P.2d
1289, 1295 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 765 P.2d 207, 214;
HMO-W Inc. v. SSM Health Care Sys., 611 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Wis. 2000); Brown v. Arp,
141 P.3d 673, 683 (Wyo. 2006).
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dissenters‘ statutes has been cited as a compelling reason to deny the
minority discount in the dissenters context.85 In Pueblo Bancorporation v.
Lindoe, Inc.,86 the Colorado Supreme Court rejected both the minority and
marketability discount in connection with the interpretation of a pre-1999
formulation of the Model Business Corporation Act that did not yet
expressly prohibit such discounts.87 Subsequently in 1999, the Model
Business Corporation Act was amended to expressly eschew the minority
and marketability discounts for purposes of the definition of ―fair value.‖88
The ALI Principles of Corporate Governance similarly reject the minority
discount, but leave open the application of the marketability discount in
extraordinary circumstances as discussed below.89
The argument against minority discounts originating in dissenters‘
rights cases has been extended to the broader context of close corporation
oppression cases. In Elder v. Elder,90 for instance, two brothers owned a
closely held company in which the plaintiff owned 40% and his brother
owned the remaining 60% of the corporation. The defendant had taken
away the plaintiff‘s salary and check-writing privileges and terminated his
role as vice president. The appellate court noted that the lower court had
embraced precedents emphasizing that:
A minority discount frustrates the equitable purpose of protecting
a minority shareholder from a squeeze-out . . . remedying
shareholder oppression has the same objective of protecting a
minority shareholder. The exclusion of Richard [the minority
shareholder] created the same situation faced by a dissenter
shareholder in a closely held corporation: ―The shareholder not
only lacks control over corporate decision making, but also upon
the application of a minority discount receives less than
proportional value for loss of that control.‖ Equity is served by
allowing the ―squeezed‖ shareholder his or her proportionate
interest of the corporation as a going concern.91
The trend away from the minority discount may also be seen in the
partnership arena. Section 701 of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act

85. Brown v. Arp, 141 P.3d at 687.
86. 63 P.3d 353 (Colo. 2003).
87. Id. at 368-69.
88. See 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (1998) (authorizing a buy-out in lieu of a
judicial dissolution); Id. at §§ 13.01(4), 13-3 (1998) (providing guidelines for determining
fair value defined as ―. . . the value of the corporation‘s shares . . . using customary and
current valuation concepts . . . without discounting for lack of marketability or minority
status‖).
89. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 7.22 (2007).
90. Elder v. Elder, No. 2006AP2937, 2007 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1130 (Wis. App. Dec.
27, 2007).
91. Id. at *12-14 (internal citations omitted).
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provides that a disassociated partner has the right to obtain a ―buyout‖ of
his interest at the greater of the liquidation value or the amount
distributable to the dissociating partner if the entire business had been sold
as a going concern without the dissociating partner.92 In addition, interest
is payable from the date of the dissociation. The comments to RUPA
indicate that the buyout price envisioned in RUPA is formulated to reject
the minority discount but may encompass the application of a marketability
discount or other relevant discounts.93 The comments indicate that other
discounts may be fair and appropriate to reflect the private nature of the
firm or to factor in a discount for the loss of a key partner.94
92. See REVISED UNIF. P‘SHIP ACT § 701 (1997), available
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uparta/1997act_final.htm.
(a) If a partner is dissociated from a partnership without resulting in a
dissolution and winding up of the partnership business under Section 801, the
partnership shall cause the dissociated partner‘s interest in the partnership to be
purchased for a buyout price determined pursuant to subsection (b).
(b) The buyout price of a dissociated partner‘s interest is the amount that would
have been distributable to the dissociating partner under Section 807(b) if, on
the date of dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a price equal
to the greater of the liquidation value or the value based on a sale of the entire
business as a going concern without the dissociated partner and the partnership
were wound up as of that date. Interest must be paid from the date of
dissociation to the date of payment.

at

93. Id. § 701 cmt. 3 (emphasis added) provides:
The terms ―fair market value‖ or ―fair value‖ were not used because they are
often considered terms of art having a special meaning depending on the
context, such as in tax or corporate law. ―Buyout price‖ is a new term. It is
intended that the term be developed as an independent concept appropriate to
the partnership buyout situation, while drawing on valuation principles
developed elsewhere.
Under subsection (b), the buyout price is the amount that would have been
distributable to the dissociating partner under Section 807(b) if, on the date of
dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a price equal to the
greater of liquidation value or going concern value without the departing
partner. Liquidation value is not intended to mean distress sale value. Under
general principles of valuation, the hypothetical selling price in either case
should be the price that a willing and informed buyer would pay a willing and
informed seller, with neither being under any compulsion to deal. The notion of
a minority discount in determining the buyout price is negated by valuing the
business as a going concern. Other discounts, such as for a lack of
marketability or the loss of a key partner, may be appropriate, however.
94. See Warnick v. Warnick, 133 P.3d 997, 1004 (2006) (failing to discuss the
marketability discount, but holding that, pursuant to Wyoming‘s partnership statute that
included willing buyer/willing seller language, there should be no reduction for hypothetical
costs of selling the business where the business is continued after the buyout of the
dissociating partner). See generally Donald J. Weidner and John W. Larson, The Revised
Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporters’ Overview, 49 BUS. LAW. 1, 11 (1993) (indicating
that the buy-out to the dissociating partner should be based on the higher of the liquidation
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The similarity between cases involving dissenting shareholders and
cases involving withdrawing partners was observed by the Maryland
Circuit Court, which concluded that both the minority and marketability
discounts should be disregarded in the case of the withdrawing partner as
the dissenting shareholder.95 In Larkin v. Ratta,96 the court noted:
The logic of the authorities that reject both minority and
marketability discounts in the dissenting shareholder context is
equally applicable to a valuation analysis under § 10-604. This is
not a marketplace transaction involving a third party purchaser.
Instead it is a statutory redemption intended to make the
withdrawing partners whole by allowing them to ―cash out‖ their
interests.97
In summary, there is growing support for disregarding the minority
discount in dissenters‘ rights cases, in close corporation oppression cases,98
and under statutory formulations contained in the Model Business
Corporation Act.99 As more fully discussed below, while the American
Law Institute‘s Principles of Corporate Governance and the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act reject the minority discount, they take a slightly
more permissive stance vis-à-vis the marketability discount.100
B.

The Marketability Discount in the Corporate and Partnership Setting

As discussed in Part II above, the marketability discount is designed to
adjust the value of the enterprise to take into account the fact that it is a
private entity without a ready market and it may take time to sell the
enterprise. This delay, or illiquidity, presents unknown risks concerning
possible changes in technology, competition, or markets. The discount
adjusts for the lack of liquidity because there are presumably a limited
number of buyers for a privately-held enterprise.101
value or the going concern value, and that the dissociating partner should not be paid for his
human capital that goes with him).
95. Larkin v. Della Ratta, No. C-2002-80490.BC, 2005 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 18, at *33
(Md. Cir. Ct. March 24, 2005).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Baur v. Baur Farms, Inc., No. 9-9-31/09-0480, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 117, at
*20-21 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2010) (observing that the legislature has prohibited the
marketability and minority discounts).
99. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (authorizing a buy-out in lieu of a judicial
dissolution); § 13.01(4) at 13-3 (1998) (providing guidelines for determining fair value
defined as ―the value of the corporation‘s shares . . . using customary and current valuation
concepts . . . without discounting for lack of marketability or minority status . . . .‖).
100. See infra Part II.B.
101. See Larkin v. Della Ratta, No. C-2002-80480.BC, 2005 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 18,
*29-30 (Md. Cir. Ct. March 24, 2005) (―A marketability discount adjusts for the lack of
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Many of the arguments that have been levied against the minority
discount in the context of dissenting shareholder cases can be advanced
against the marketability discount as well.102 Like the minority discount,
the marketability discount adjusts to market conditions, whereas the goal of
both dissenters‘ rights statutes and oppression remedies is to compensate
the investor for the loss of the investment opportunity. From a policy
standpoint, the application of a marketability discount similarly introduces
uncertainty in the valuation process and runs the risk of rewarding the
majority misconduct.103
Even in the absence of express statutory condemnation, Cavalier Oil
set the stage for rejecting the idea of discounting generally by emphasizing
that the point of an appraisal was not to simulate a pro forma sale.104 Then,
in 1999, the Model Business Corporation Act was amended to expressly
prohibit both minority and marketability discounts in its definition of ―fair
value‖ governing buy-outs pursuant to dissenters‘ statutes and buy-outs in
lieu of judicial dissolution triggered by illegal, oppressive or fraudulent
majority conduct.105
The American Law Institute takes a slightly more permissive approach
to the marketability discount than to the minority discount.106 While
prohibiting the minority discount under its definition of fair value for buyouts in appraisal actions, the ALI leaves the door slightly ajar with regard
to the marketability discount.107 In defining fair value, the ALI provides
that ―the fair value of shares under § 7.21 (Corporate Transactions Giving
Rise to Appraisal Rights) should be the value of the eligible holder‘s [§
1.17] proportionate interest in the corporation, without any discount for
liquidity based on the notion that there are limited potential buyers for shares in a small
organization.‖).
102. See East Park Ltd. P‘ship v. Larkin, 893 A.2d 1219, 1231-33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2006) (discussing the arguments against the marketability discount); Drury Indus., Inc. v.
Drury Props., Inc., No. 03-00852A, 2005 WL 5072229, nn.10-12 (Nev. Dist. Ct. March 23,
2005) (involving a cash-out merger).
103. East Park, 893 A.2d at 1232.
104. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145-46 (Del. 1989). The Delaware
corporate statute contains no definition of ―fair value‖ and no express direction regarding
the minority or marketability discounts. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2010) (showing
the lack of statutory condemnation of discounting under relevant Delaware appraisal law).
105. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (authorizing a buy-out in lieu of a judicial
dissolution); § 13.01(4) at 13-3 (1998) (providing guidelines for determining fair value
defined as ―the value of the corporation‘s shares . . . using customary and current valuation
concepts . . . without discounting for lack of marketability or minority status . . . .‖). See
also Brown v. Arp and Hammond Hardware Co., 141 P.3d 673, 684 (Wyo. 2006)
(discussing thoroughly the Model Business Corporation Act‘s provisions pertaining to
discounts in a dissenters‘ rights buy-out case).
106. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.22, at
314-15.
107. See id.
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minority status or, absent extraordinary circumstances, lack of
marketability.‖108 The ALI does not itself provide a statutory provision for
judicial buy-outs in the event of oppressive conduct. Nevertheless, the ALI
does contain some commentary on oppressive conduct suits and suggests
that courts might properly look to the ALI‘s guidelines for determining fair
value under dissenters‘ provisions in implementing buy-outs occurring in
the context of oppressive conduct statutes.109
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act also leaves the door slightly
ajar with respect to discounts other than the minority discount, providing
that other discounts ―such as for a lack of marketability or the loss of a key
partner, may be appropriate . . . .‖110 As noted previously, the Revised
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act authorizes a judicial dissolution,
but is silent with regard to the possibility of a court-ordered purchase in
lieu of a dissolution and thus, contains no guidance on valuation matters.111
Thus, while there seems to be a strong consensus against the minority
discount among the Model Business Corporation Code, the ALI, and the
RUPA, there are subtle differences regarding the marketability discount,
with the Model Business Corporation Code rejecting the marketability
discount outright, and the ALI and the RUPA generally rejecting the
marketability discount, but possibly countenancing rare exceptions (albeit
extraordinary exceptions, in the case of the ALI).112
C.

Emerging LLC Case Law

There is comparatively little LLC case law that addresses the
valuation of LLC interests in connection with oppressive conduct. In
108. See id. (providing that:
The fair value of shares under 7.21 (Corporate Transactions Giving Rise to
Appraisal Rights) should be the value of the eligible holder‘s [1.17]
proportionate interest in the corporation, without any discount for minority
status or, absent extraordinary circumstances, lack of marketability. Subject to
Subsections (b) and (c), fair value should be determined using the customary
valuation concepts and techniques generally employed in the relevant securities
and financial markets for similar businesses in the context of the transaction
giving rise to appraisal.
).
109. Id. § 7.21 cmt. h, at 312.
110. REVISED UNIF. P‘SHIP ACT § 701 cmt. 3 (1997), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uparta/1997act_final.htm.
111. Id.
112. In 2003, the court indicated that of the jurisdictions with ―fair value‖ statutes, courts
in fifteen states had held that a marketability discount should not be applied, and only six
states had concluded that fair value may include marketability discounts (Florida, Illinois,
Kentucky, Virginia interpreting Maryland law, New York, and Oregon). Pueblo
Bancorporation v. Lindoe Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 366-68 (Colo. 2003).
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Marsh v. Billington Farms, LLC,113 the Rhode Island Superior Court
summarily concluded, based upon a Rhode Island corporate oppression
case, that the minority and marketability discount should not apply.114
Also, the court failed to explore whether there were precedents from Rhode
Island partnership cases that might be relevant. Interestingly, the court
applied its corporate statute‘s dissolution provisions applicable even though
the case under consideration involved an LLC. Clearly, the corporate
oppression statute was the inappropriate provision. Rhode Island‘s LLC
dissolution provision allows for judicial dissolution when it is no longer
reasonably practicable to carry on the business.115 Apparently, the parties
had disputed this point but had entered into a consent order agreeing to
apply the corporate provision anyway. In any event, the decision provides
virtually no policy analysis regarding LLC valuation matters.
Nevertheless, Marsh shows a judicial willingness to apply without question
corporate precedents regarding the minority and marketability discounts to
the LLC.116
In Denike v. Cupo,117 a case involving a dispute between co-owners of
an LLC, a New Jersey Superior court upheld a valuation of an LLC interest
without regard to a marketability or minority discount, even though the
New Jersey LLC statute provides that upon resignation of a member, the
member is entitled to receive the ―fair value of his limited liability
company interest . . . less all applicable valuation discounts, unless the
operating agreement provides for another distribution formula.‖118 The
appellate court observed that there is not an inflexible test for determining
fair value, and refused to conclude that the valuation expert‘s opinion was
contrary to accepted valuation methodology. The opinion emphasized that
the decision was not inconsistent with accepted valuation principles since
accepted principles recognized that the minority and marketability
discounts should not apply where an actual sale of an entire business
appears unlikely.119 The court largely ignored the statute‘s reference to
discounts in the wording of the LLC statute. Had the court addressed this
specific statutory language it might have concluded that no valuation
discounts were applicable under the facts, especially given the nature of the
business at issue.

113. 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 105 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2007).
114. Id. at *12-13 (citing Charland v. Country View Golf Club, 588 A.2d 609, 613 (R.I.
1991)).
115. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-40 (2010).
116. Marsh v. Billington Farms, LLC, C.A. No. PB 04-3123, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS
105 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2007).
117. Denike v. Cupo, 926 A.2d 869, 887 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
118. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-39 (West 2010); Denike, 926 A.2d at 884-85.
119. 926 A.2d at 884-85.
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Another recent LLC valuation controversy arose in the context of a
divorce. In In re Thornhill,120 the Colorado Supreme Court was asked to
determine the appropriateness of applying a marketability discount to
determine the value of NGR Services, LLC, an LLC that was an oil and gas
service company.121 The magistrate refused to extend the holding of
Pueblo Bancorporation v. Liondoe, Inc., which prohibited a marketability
discount in a dissenters‘ rights case to a divorce proceeding. The trial court
enforced a separation agreement that had used a 33% marketability
discount in valuing an LLC interest. The Appellate Court reversed, finding
that the separation agreement was unconscionable, and also went on to
reject the wife‘s argument that a per se rule disregarding the marketability
discount should be applied in the divorce context.122 Although the
Colorado Supreme Court determined that the Pueblo decision had
interpreted the statutory language ―fair value‖ in the specific context of a
dissenters‘ statute, the present case arose under a different statute and did
not use the term ―fair value.‖123 Pueblo had reasoned that the legislature
would have used the term ―fair market value‖ if it so intended, and that the
term ―fair value‖ value did not encompass the marketability discount.124
The minority discount was not at issue in the divorce case.125
In In re Thornhill, the Colorado Supreme Court observed that while
there was a national trend against the marketability discount in dissenters‘
cases, there was no similar national consensus prohibiting the marketability
discount in a divorce setting.126 In fact, the Court observed that most courts
had left the question of the marketability discount to the court‘s discretion
when valuing the interest of a company in a divorce proceeding.127 The
Court emphasized that in the context of divorce, a non-member spouse is
not a victim of shareholder oppression, and stressed that the goal in the
valuation is to reach an equitable division of marital property. 128 Although
In re Thornhill will obviously impact future divorce valuation cases, it
leaves open the question of valuation of LLCs in other contexts not
involving divorce. Presumably, in the face of Pueblo, it will be difficult to
support the application of either a minority or marketability discount in the
context of a squeeze-out of a Colorado LLC member.
Thus, at present, outside of the divorce context, the few LLC cases

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

232 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2010).
Id. at 784-85.
Id. at 786.
Id.
Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., 63 P. 3d 353, 361 (Colo. 2003).
In re Thornhill, 232 P.3d at 782.
Id. at 786.
Id.
Id.
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that have addressed valuation questions have not applied minority or
marketability discounts. The decision in Denike is somewhat helpful in its
attempt to explain why the marketability discount was not applicable under
the facts.129 According to the court, there would be no actual transfer of the
company and a sale of the company appears unlikely.130 It appears that the
court felt that because there was no real market for the LLC, adjustment of
the LLC‘s value to reflect market conditions would be inappropriate. As
more fully discussed below, the improbability that a company will ever be
sold presents a sound rationale for eschewing the marketability discount.
However, the court‘s analysis of the marketability discount issue in Denike
is somewhat incomplete. The court fails to mention that the New Jersey
Supreme Court has recognized that extraordinary circumstances may
sometimes justify the marketability discount.131 Perhaps the court deemed
that such circumstances could only arise where the LLC has the possibility
of a credible market. However, the decision would have been more helpful
had it fully analyzed New Jersey corporate precedents.
Given the paucity of direct guidance in the LLC setting, courts should
look to the relevant jurisdiction‘s corporate and partnership precedents to
determine whether a minority and/or marketability discount should be
applied. As more fully discussed below, the question of whether discounts
should apply is context-specific. Different policy considerations may be
presented depending upon whether the valuation question arises in the
setting of oppressive conduct, the exercise of dissenters‘ rights, a divorce
settlement, or a tax controversy. An appreciation of the policy issues raised
in specific settings, and a keen sensitivity to the facts presented in the
controversy, are indispensable.
As discussed below, in the context of oppressive conduct, there are
strong policy reasons favoring a per se prohibition of the minority discount.
In addition, there are compelling arguments supporting a general rule
prohibiting the marketability discount. In tax contexts and/or in divorce
settings, different policy and statutory terms may come into play. Some
courts have argued that in the divorce context, a different and more flexible
approach to valuation may be appropriate.132 However, a number of the
129. Denike v. Cupo, 926 A.2d 869, 884-885 (N.J. App. 2010).
130. Id. at 382-383.
131. Id. The decision cites Balsamides v. Protameen Chems. Inc., 734 A.2d 721 (N.J.
1999), but does not explain why Balsamides presented extraordinary circumstances
justifying a marketability discount. The case, however, should be distinguished from the
facts presented in Balsamide where the court held that it would be inequitable to require one
fifty-percent owner to buy out another where the purchasing shareholder was apparently the
victim of the other fifty-percent owner‘s difficult conduct. Id.
132. See Sweet v. Sweet, No. 2007-A-0003 and 2008-A-0003, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS
1607 at *32, *45 (Ohio App. Apr. 27, 2009) (observing broad discretion to adopt a method
for valuation in a divorce case and upholding discretion to employ marketability discounts).
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arguments against the discounts appear relevant in both the oppression and
divorce settings.
V.

A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO THE LLC DISCOUNT DILEMMA

An appreciation of the policy issues raised in each LLC valuation
setting will be important to the development of a well-supported approach
to the minority discount and the marketability discount in the LLC. It is
important for courts to be cognizant of the context of the valuation case and
whether it arises in the setting of an oppression suit, an ordinary withdrawal
from the LLC, a divorce, or under other circumstances.
The context of the law is of growing importance in connection with
contract interpretation as well as in other areas of jurisprudence, both
within and outside of the United States.133 In writing about the benefits of a
contextual approach to law, Professor Larry DiMatteo recently discussed
―[t]he rule that Llewellyn targets for criticism is what he calls the rule-ofthumb or paper rule.‖134 Professor DiMatteo describes this as a rule that is
cut off from its underlying reasons.135 Under a contextual approach, the
outcome of a legal result will be highly dependent upon the specific facts
and circumstances, as well as the special interests, that are presented in a
particular setting.136 In the case of the minority and/or a marketability
discount, each specific setting, whether oppression or otherwise, raises its
own policy considerations.
A.

Policy Concerns Raised by the Minority Discount in the Oppression
Setting and Beyond

As can be gleaned from the above corporate and partnership contexts,
there are compelling reasons to eschew the minority discount in LLC cases
involving minority oppression. These reasons apply with equal force in the
setting of an LLC. On balance, in minority LLC oppression cases, a per se
rule makes sense. First, the purpose of a judicial buy-out of an LLC
133. See generally Shalin M. Sugunasiri, Contextualism: The Supreme Court’s New
Standard of Judicial Analysis and Accountability, 22 DALHOUSIE L. J. 126 (1999)
(discussing contextualism in the Supreme Court of Canada).
134. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of
Interpretation, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 397, 477-78 (2004) (observing broad discretion to
adopt a method for valuation in a divorce case and upholding discretion to employ
marketability discounts).
135. Id.
136. See id. See generally Larry A. DiMatteo & Blake D. Morant, Contract in Context
and Contract As Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 549 (2010); Sandra K. Miller, Legal
Realism, the LLC, and a Balanced Approach to the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 729 (2010).
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interest is not to closely simulate a market sale, but rather, to fashion a
sensible remedy to compensate for a lost investment. A judicially ordered
buy-out occasioned by oppressive conduct is not voluntary in any sense of
the word.137 As a forced sale that is the product of majority coercion, the
judicial buy-out fails to involve a willing seller and willing buyer, the
hallmark of which is a sale at ―fair market value.‖138 Further, from the
standpoint of a majority LLC purchaser, a judicial buy-out by the majority
of a minority LLC interest may not be the acquisition of a minority interest
at all if the buyer already owns a majority of the LLC.139 As previously
discussed in the corporate oppression case law, it could be argued that the
application of a minority discount runs the risk of rewarding oppressive
conduct by possibly permitting a buy-out of the minority‘s LLC interest at
a bargain price.140 Application of the minority discount arguably penalizes
the minority, unfairly enriches the majority, and undermines the deterrence
function of oppression statutes.141 Further, the assumption of a hypothetical
sale of the minority interest may be an entirely inappropriate premise where
the minority interest has no value to others besides to the minority, where
there is no market for the LLC, or where sales to outsiders would never be
contemplated.142 Finally, the minority discount may introduce a troubling
degree of uncertainty into the valuation process.143
Are there any policy arguments in support of a minority LLC
discount? If one considers the perspective of the minority, the interest
being sold is truly a minority interest even if it is being purchased by a
majority owner. In fact, the reason why the minority may have petitioned
137. See Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations:
Oppression, Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations, 20 J. CORP. L. 371, 372 (2003)
(emphasizing that the oppression remedy under Oregon law does not attempt to simulate a
sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer).
138. See Treas. Reg. 20.2031-1(b) (2009) (indicating that fair market value is the price at
which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant
facts).
139. See generally Moll, supra note 3, at 324.
140. See Harry Haynesworth IV, Valuation of Business Interests, 33 MERCER L. REV.
457, 489 (1982) (observing that in cases involving squeeze-outs, discounts may undermine
the purposes of dissenters or oppression statutes).
141. See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989) (emphasizing
speculative characteristics of the minority discount, the penalizing impact upon the
minority, and the potential enrichment of the majority). See also Elder v. Elder, No.
2006AP2937, 2007 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1130 (Wis. App. 2007); Brown v. Arp and
Hammond Hardware Co., 141 P.3d 673 (Wyo. 2006) (emphasizing deterrence function of
dissenters‘ statutes and rejecting the minority discount).
142. Id. See also Denike v. Cupo, 926 A.2d 869, 884-85 (N.J. App. 2010).
143. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989) (stating that a
minority discount may introduce a troubling degree of uncertainty into the valuation
process).
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the buy-out is likely to be because the controlling LLC member exercised
majority powers to the minority‘s detriment. Some may contend that a
judicial buy-out at an undiscounted price gives the minority an incentive to
threaten dissolution and could present a roadmap for opportunistic minority
conduct.144 Finally, one might argue that under a number of LLC statutes,
LLC judicial buy-outs are not triggered by ―oppressive conduct,‖ but rather
occur when it is ―no longer reasonably practicable‖ to carry on the business
of the LLC. The ―no longer reasonably practicable‖ standard arguably
does not present the protective minority purpose that is present where the
applicable statute directs the judicial action when ―oppression‖ has taken
place.
Notwithstanding these counter arguments, on balance, a per se
prohibition upon the minority discount still makes sense under both LLC
statutes triggering the judicial action based upon ―oppression‖ as well as
under LLC statutory provisions utilizing the ―not reasonably practicable to
do business‖ formulation. The arguments against the minority discount are
more compelling than those in favor of it in the presence of ―oppression.‖
The need to deter rather than facilitate exploitive majority conduct has been
a cornerstone of the argument against the minority discount in corporate
dissenters‘ and corporate squeeze-out settings. Thus, in the setting of LLC
buy-outs occasioned by assertions of majority oppression, the deterrence
rationale largely supports a general rule prohibiting the minority discount.
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act rejects the minority discount
across the board with respect to partnership dissociations, including
withdrawals—not just dissociations occasioned by misconduct.145 Some
144. See Hunt v. Data Management Resources, Inc., 985 P.2d 730, 732 (Kan. App. 1999)
(involving a minority shareholder who sold the S Corporation stock to a corporation in an
effort to disqualify the corporation from S Corporation status and thus coerce a buy-out at a
given price).
145. See UNIF. P‘SHIP ACT § 801(5)(ii) (1997). See also the REVISED UNIF. P‘SHIP ACT §
701, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uparta/1997act_final.htm.
(a) If a partner is dissociated from a partnership without resulting in a
dissolution and winding up of the partnership business under Section 801, the
partnership shall cause the dissociated partner‘s interest in the partnership to be
purchased for a buyout price determined pursuant to subsection (b).
(b) The buyout price of a dissociated partner‘s interest is the amount that would
have been distributable to the dissociating partner under Section 807(b) if, on
the date of dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a price equal
to the greater of the liquidation value or the value based on a sale of the entire
business as a going concern without the dissociated partner and the partnership
were wound up as of that date. Interest must be paid from the date of
dissociation to the date of payment.
Comment 3 provides:
The terms ―fair market value‖ or ―fair value‖ were not used because they are
often considered terms of art having a special meaning depending on the
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may argue that the applicable LLC statute would have included similar
language had the drafters of the LLC statute intended to similarly prohibit
the minority discount. However, others may argue that the absence of
similar language is not dispositive and that given the similarity between
partnerships and LLCs, statutory language designed to disregard minority
discounts in partnership valuations lends weight to the argument against the
minority discount in the LLC context.
Another compelling argument supporting the disregard of the minority
discount in the LLC is that, from the standpoint of the LLC, there is no
acquisition of a minority interest when the minority withdraws from the
LLC; rather, the LLC continues under ownership of the remaining
members.146 Finally, a particularly persuasive argument is that the minority
discount creates substantial uncertainty in the setting of the LLC. This is
especially evident when keeping in mind that the overall goal of LLC
business entity governance is to allow business planners to achieve
certainty and predictability in business affairs. However, this uncertainty
argument may be countered somewhat by emphasizing that an LLC
member who could have achieved certainty via express contractual buy-out
and valuation provisions but chose not to should not be allowed thereafter
to complain about uncertain judicial valuation laws. Nevertheless,
regardless of whether an LLC member contractually self-protected, the
goals of certainty and predictability in business entity governance are
important considerations in selecting alternative business entities such as
context, such as in tax or corporate law. ―Buyout price‖ is a new term. It is
intended that the term be developed as an independent concept appropriate to
the partnership buyout situation, while drawing on valuation principles
developed elsewhere.
Under subsection (b), the buyout price is the amount that would have been
distributable to the dissociating partner under Section 807(b) if, on the date of
dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a price equal to the
greater of liquidation value or going concern value without the departing
partner. Liquidation value is not intended to mean distress sale value. Under
general principles of valuation, the hypothetical selling price in either case
should be the price that a willing and informed buyer would pay a willing and
informed seller, with neither being under any compulsion to deal. The notion of
a minority discount in determining the buyout price is negated by valuing the
business as a going concern. Other discounts, such as for a lack of marketability
or the loss of a key partner, may be appropriate, however.
146. It is noteworthy that the Revised Uniform Partnership Act uses the ―no longer
reasonably practicable‖ standard for partnership dissolutions. See Cannon v. Bertrand, 2 So.
3d 393, 396-97 (La. 2009) (refusing to apply the marketability or minority discount where
one of three partners withdrew from a Louisiana LLP and indicating that such discounts
must be used sparingly and only when the facts support their use; also indicating that, under
the facts, the remaining two partners were not subject to a lack of control as would be the
case if the withdrawing partner‘s interest were sold to a third party since each of the
remaining two partners had an equal say in the control of the partnership).
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LLCs. Therefore, LLC jurisprudence should be developed in a way that
maximizes certainty and predictability as much as possible. To the extent
that the minority discount contributes to uncertainty, it constitutes a
provision that runs counter to important overall policy goals underlying
LLC jurisprudence.
Valuations in connection with divorce present slightly different policy
concerns, but many of the objections to the minority discount in oppression
cases apply with equal force in the context of divorce. Indeed, there are
important differences between the divorce and minority squeeze-out
settings. In the minority squeeze-out context, the buy-out may be coerced,
and thus fair market value adjustments—such as discounts that arise
between a willing buyer and a willing seller—are arguably irrelevant.
Although there is not always a definitive judicial finding of oppressive
conduct or fault, there typically is an overriding policy interest in
protecting the minority investor. Thus, it is important that the valuation
process not be used in a manner that facilitates the expulsion of the
minority.
In the context of divorce, the overall goal of the proceeding for an
equitable distribution of property is not to protect one party or the other,
but rather to fairly and equitably apportion marital property and to
recognize each party‘s contribution to an economic partnership.147 There is
an overriding concern that the parties honestly disclose the assets that are
owned. However, there is not the same concern that discounts might
operate as incentives for squeeze-out behavior. Also, in a divorce there
may be no actual transfer of the business interest. In a typical minority
squeeze-out one can argue that the minority discount essentially vanishes
because, from the perspective of the majority, the majority isn‘t buying a
minority interest. However, in a divorce, one party may not be buying out
a business interest at all. Thus, the argument that the minority discount
vanishes does not apply. The statutory context of the divorce is distinct.
Also, the relevant divorce statute may not necessarily use the terms ―fair
value‖ or ―fair market value‖ in authorizing how to reach valuation
judgments; thus, there may not be a direct statutory connection between
valuations occurring in divorce and precedents involving corporate
dissenters‘ rights and/or corporate oppression cases.148 As one court

147. See Benjamin M. Ellis, Protecting the Right to Marital Property: Ensuring a Full
Equitable Distribution Award With Fraudulent Conveyance Law, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
1709, 1720-21 (2009) (observing that the goal of equitable distribution of property is to
recognize and compensate each spouse for his or her contribution to the economic
partnership).
148. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502 (2010) (providing court authority to make an
equitable division of marital property and setting forth factors to consider such as length of
marriage, prior marriages, age, health, education, etc.; not containing guidelines for
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recently noted:
There admittedly is a significant debate about when marketability
discounts are appropriate in any proceeding requiring the
valuation of a closely held corporation. . . . It seems that the
debate is sometimes led astray by the application of broad
generalizations that do not differentiate between the types of
proceedings within which valuations are required, nor
acknowledge that the appropriate analysis for the valuation of a
business may change depending upon the specific legal and
factual context presented.149
Although these comments were made with regard to the marketability
discount, they are equally applicable to the minority discount.
In spite of the differences between the squeeze-out and divorce
settings, there are still some significant objections to the minority discount
that apply with equal force in both the oppression and divorce contexts.
The minority discount injects unwarranted uncertainty and a lack of
predictability in both oppression and divorce LLC cases. Also, regardless
of whether the valuation occurs in a squeeze-out or a divorce, an
adjustment for the minority discount still makes little sense when the
business itself does not have a market and is unlikely ever to be sold. Thus,
although a number of arguments against the minority discount have little
application to the divorce context, there are still some important reasons
that support a prohibition of the minority discount in some divorce settings.
B.

Policy Issues Surrounding the Marketability Discount in the
Oppression Context and Beyond

Although the Colorado Supreme Court refused to extend the holding
of Pueblo Bancorporation, prohibiting the marketability discount to a
divorce proceeding, some of the policy reasons supporting the disregard of
the marketability discount appear to make sense in both divorce and
oppression contexts.150 Because of the significance of these problems, even
valuation of property). See generally Buckl v. Buckl, 542 A.2d 65, 70-71 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (indicating that a partnership interest is part of the marital property and should be
valued in accordance with the partnership agreement and the relevant Uniform Partnership
provisions).
149. Erp v. Erp, 976 So. 2d 1234, 1239-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
150. See In re Thornhill, 232 P.3d 782 (Colo. 2010) (holding that trial court may, in its
discretion, apply marketability discounts when valuing ownership interests in closely-held
corporations because the Pueblo considerations are not applicable here); Pueblo
Bancorporation v. Lindoe Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 364-65 (Colo. 2003) (―The purpose of the
dissenters‘ rights statute would best be fulfilled through an interpretation of ‗fair value‘
which ensures minority shareholders are compensated for what they have lost, that is, their
proportionate ownership interest in a going concern. A marketability discount is
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if a court refuses to adopt a general prohibition of discounts in divorce
proceedings, nevertheless, there may be reasons to disregard the
marketability discount in individual cases involving an equitable
distribution of property.
There may be a number of problems with the marketability discount
both within and outside of the oppression setting. Whether the buy-out
occurs because it is ―no longer practicable‖ to do business or because a
member simply dissociates from the LLC, the marketability discount
arguably injects uncertainty into the law.151 As indicated above, investors
may have selected the LLC form precisely to gain some control and
certainty over legal and business responsibilities.152 In addition, the
marketability discount presents some other problems which may be
relevant not just in the event of oppression, but also in ordinary
withdrawals, and even in other settings such as in divorce. These other
problems include the double-counting problem observed by at least one
court,153 the undervaluation risk—also called the under-compensation
risk,154 and what I shall call the market irrelevancy issue. These problems
tend to support a rule that would disallow the marketability discount.
The double-counting issue arguably arises if the LLC is valued in a
manner that already reflects private market data. As one court noted:
There is a recognized risk of double-counting by an expert, that
is, duplicative reductions in the value of the minority interest in a
closely-held business, as a result of increasing the capitalization
rate (and decreasing the valuation multiple) to account for limited
marketability, and then in addition applying a ―marketability
discount‖ to the value derived from capitalizing income.155
Courts do not always pick up on the problem of double counting the
reduction necessary to reflect the private nature of the LLC.156 For
inconsistent with this interpretation . . . .‖).
151. Pueblo Bancorporation, 63 P.3d at 364-65.
152. See Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom
with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the
LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1610 (2004) (―[I]n an atmosphere of escalating jury awards,
practitioners advocated control over the legal liability of their clients with respect to both
co-investors and third parties.‖).
153. See Brown v. Brown, 792 A.2d 463, 475-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(observing that an adjustment for the private nature of the firm already had been made in the
valuation of the underlying business).
154. See Moll, supra note 3, at 293 (arguing that the buyout remedy should provide an
oppressed minority investor with his pro rata share of the company‘s overall value with no
reductions for the lack of control or liquidity associated with the minority‘s share).
155. Brown, 792 A.2d at 475.
156. See Balsamides v. Protameen Chems. Inc., 734 A.2d 721 (N.J. 1999) (holding that
the trial court acted within its discretion in the court-ordered buyout when it valued the
oppressing shareholder‘s shares using the ―excess earnings‖ method). But see Brown, 792
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example, in Balsamides v. Protameen Chems. Inc.,157 the New Jersey
Supreme Court applied a marketability discount in a buy-out case
occasioned by oppressive conduct.158 According to one commentator, the
valuation expert had already relied upon an IRS Revenue Procedure which
utilizes an approach specific to the valuation of private business interests.159
The additional application of a marketability discount arguably double
counted the valuation adjustment due to the private nature of the
business.160
Some may refute the double-counting rationale for rejecting the
marketability discount by pointing to the fact that the marketability
discount is an adjustment for unknown and/or unknowable risks that do not
necessarily get factored into the underlying valuation of a private company.
In valuing the underlying business, some valuation experts may adjust
assets and/or capitalization rates to reflect a variety of risk factors specific
to the particular business—i.e. poor facilities, aging management, new
competition, lags in technological advancement, nepotism. However, these
risk factors are not necessarily associated with the unknowable risks of
being locked into an investment without a ready market. Advocates of the
marketability discount may take the position that the marketability discount
is not typically considered in valuing the underlying business and is a
necessary additional downward adjustment to reflect the risks of ownership
associated with an illiquid investment.161 But one must remember that in a
buy-out occasioned by a squeeze-out the court is not necessarily trying to
simulate market conditions, but rather is attempting to provide damages for
the involuntary deprivation of an investment. Further, in a divorce context,
the goal is not necessarily the simulation of market conditions in a
hypothetical sale, but rather is to arrive at an equitable distribution of

A.2d at 475-76 (adhering to a prohibition on marketability discounts absent extraordinary
circumstances in divorce cases as well as other types of cases; also indicating that a
marketability discount would double count the risk associated with the private nature of the
company.).
157. Balsamides, 734 A.2d at 721. See Charles F. Vuotto & Scott A. Maier, The
Continuing Debate About Brown: What Constitutes “Extraordinary Circumstances”?
(2003),
http://tvelaw.com/newjerseydivorcearticles/debate.htm
(examining
when
―extraordinary circumstances‖ arise such that valuation discounts are warranted).
158. Balsamides, 734 A.2d at 737-38.
159. Vuotto & Maier, supra note 157.
160. Id.
161. See R. GLENN HUBBARD, MONEY, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, AND THE ECONOMY 137
(Denise Clinton ed. 2008) (―Lenders value liquidity . . . an instrument traded in a less liquid
market will have a lower price and a greater required return than an instrument traded in a
more liquid market.‖). See also LLOYD B. THOMAS, MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL
MARKETS 129 (Jack Calhoun ed., Thomson 2006) (according to the liquidity premium
theory, because long-term bonds entail greater market risk—long term yields will pay
more).
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property.
Even if the double counting argument is disregarded, there are still
other strong reasons to reject the marketability discount in many oppression
cases. Particularly where there has been a squeeze-out of an active
minority investor, a buy-out of the minority‘s interest may not fully
compensate the minority for the economic rights he or she has lost.162 Prof.
Moll has pointed out this undervaluation risk in his seminal article on
valuation discounts in the corporate oppression setting.163 Prof. Moll quite
correctly points out that, in a close corporation, the active minority has an
expectation of future employment, a role in management, and an interest in
a share of the value of the company.164 Prof. Moll argues that the
minority‘s employment and management interests are not typically
compensated in the buyout price which makes the minority and/or
marketability discounts even more inappropriate and unjust in oppression
cases.165
The undervaluation or ―under-compensation‖ problem to which Prof.
Moll refers obviously would not occur if the minority is a passive LLC
member but could arise if the member actively participates in the
management of the company. The active LLC member may indeed have
reasonable expectations of continued employment and an active role in
management as well as of a share in the future growth of the LLC.166
Unless the plaintiff has sued both for the buy-out price as well as for
money damages for the loss of future employment, the plaintiff may
already be losing out on an important segment of his expectation interest.
Of course, LLC ownership does not present a guarantee of future earnings.
However, a decline in compensation following the departure from an LLC
could present a substantial loss for which a buy-out price does not fully
compensate. A further reduction for a marketability discount may increase
his or her loss.
While the double-counting problem may not exist in all cases, the
under-compensation issue can be a significant problem for the active
minority plaintiff.167 In addition, what I term ―the market irrelevancy
issue‖ may arise because the reference to a market is either irrelevant or
inappropriate, given the facts and circumstances surrounding the LLC in

162. See Moll, supra note 3, at 297.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 349.
166. See Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (Or at Least Understand Why You
Should): Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce
Oppression in Closely Held Businesses?, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 514 (2009)
(discussing common strategies of oppression).
167. See id.
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dispute. For example, some private businesses are never intended for sale
and hold value only to the existing owners.168 To make a downward
adjustment to reflect an irrelevant market makes no sense. This point was
recently raised in the case Brown v. Brown,169 where the New Jersey
Superior Court denied a marketability discount to a business with no
evidence that the business would be sold outside the family in the
foreseeable future.170
In summary, like the minority discount, the marketability discount
runs the risk of rewarding oppressive conduct in buy-outs occasioned by
oppression. Also, even in contexts not involving oppression, the
marketability discount may, depending upon the facts, create or exacerbate
potential problems, including those of uncertainty, double-counting, risk of
undervaluation, and market irrelevancy. Given the significance of these
potential problems, it makes good sense to rule out the marketability
discount in LLC oppression cases in all but the most extraordinary
circumstances.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in the context of a divorce case, took
the position that a case-by-case approach to the marketability discount may
be most appropriate.171 Nevertheless, the double-counting problem, undercompensation risk, and market irrelevancy issue may still arise in the
setting of an equitable distribution. Whether in the context of a divorce or
a minority squeeze-out, it is important that the marketability discount not
be counted twice—first when valuing the underlying business, and again
when making an adjustment to reflect the lack of marketability. The undercompensation risk may be present in both divorce and squeeze-out settings
as well. A spouse may derive great value from a private business that is
not properly accounted for, by looking narrowly at the estimated price for
which the business interest could be sold. A spouse may be employed by
the company and also may derive a broad range of fringe benefits from the
business. Children, too, could be employed by the family company. The
true value of a business interest to a spouse may already be grossly
undervalued. Applying a marketability discount could exacerbate this
undervaluation problem. Finally, as indicated previously, the market value
168. See generally Harry Haynesworth IV, Valuation of Business Interests, 33 MERCER
L. REV. 457, 459 (1982) (explaining the basic principles of enterprise valuation).
169. Brown v. Brown, 792 A.2d 463, 478 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (questioning
whether a marketability discount should be allowed in a divorce action and concluding that
extraordinary circumstances did not exist to justify the application of a marketability
discount).
170. See id.
171. But see Brown v. Brown, 792 A.2d 463, 477 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(arguing that since no actual transfer of stock would take place in the equitable distribution
action and no sale of the business appeared likely in the foreseeable future, the marketability
discount was even less appropriate than in a statutory appraisal or deadlock context).
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of a business may be irrelevant where it is unlikely that the business would
or could ever be sold. This market irrelevancy issue arises regardless of
whether the valuation question occurs in an oppression case or in a divorce
proceeding.172 Thus, there may be significant reasons to prohibit a
marketability discount in certain specific divorce cases, if not in all divorce
proceedings.
C.

Should Extraordinary Circumstances or Equitable Adjustments Ever
Be Allowed in the LLC Oppression or Divorce Case?

As indicated above in the context of an LLC oppression case or a
dissenters‘ rights case, a strong general rule prohibiting both discounts is
fitting for efforts to avoid a valuation approach that indirectly facilitates
minority squeeze-outs. The divorce context lacks this singularly protective
focus of the law. As we have seen, however, a number of the same
arguments against the minority and marketability discounts appear to be
relevant in both the oppression and divorce settings. Are there ever
circumstances which would justify the imposition of a minority or
marketability discount or any other discounts in a divorce or oppression
proceeding? As alluded to earlier, the Model Business Corporation Act
prohibits all minority and marketability discounts in the definition of ―fair
value‖ that governs a buy-out in lieu of a judicial dissolution triggered by
an oppression suit.173 In contrast, the ALI and RUPA both disregard the
minority discount and the marketability discount, but recognize that there
might be exceptions for the marketability discount or other discounts in
extraordinary circumstances.174 Yet another albeit minority approach is to
disregard the minority discount, but to freely allow the marketability
discount.175
The pervasive weight of authority is clearly to disregard the minority
discount in oppression, dissenters, and even ordinary dissociation case
contexts. Furthermore, given the ALI and RUPA‘s approach to the
marketability discount, it makes sense to retain a general prohibition on the
marketability discount in such settings.176 The double-counting problem,
172. Penelope Eileen Bryan, An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion,
Exploitation, and the Law: I. Coercive and Exploitive Bargaining: The Coercion of Women
in Divorce Settlement Negotiations, 74 DENV. U.L. REV. 931, 932 (1997) (discussing the
problem of the concealment and/or undervaluation of assets in connection with divorce).
173. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4)(iii)(1998) (containing guidelines for the
determination of fair value without discounting for minority status or lack of marketability).
174. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.22, at 296
(2010); REVISED UNIF. P‘SHIP. ACT § 7.01(b), cmt. 3 (1997).
175. See supra Part II (referring to the minority approach to the marketability discount
taken by New York, and seen in some case law in Florida).
176. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.22 (2010);
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the under-compensation risk, and the market irrelevancy issue provide
compelling policy reasons to prohibit the marketability discount in the
usual LLC buy-out or dissenters case, and possibly in some, if not all
divorce proceedings.
In spite of widespread criticism of discounts, some commentators
have argued that in rare cases, the marketability discount may be
appropriate to reflect factors such as age, infirmity, or other circumstances
unique to the LLC owners in question that must be taken into account to
avoid a gross overstatement of the LLC‘s value.177 Thus, there may be
characteristics of the LLC‘s management, unique features of the LLC‘s
assets, contractual rights, cash position, or even subsequent extraordinary
and unforeseeable events that, if not taken into account, could result in a
significant and unfair overvaluation of the LLC. Such adjustments appear
to be extremely important, but they should not be made twice—first in the
underlying valuation of the company and a second time when a
marketability discount is then applied once the valuation of the business is
otherwise determined.178
Moreover, there may be unusual cases where a withdrawing LLC
member may take goodwill and/or other intellectual property with him. In
such instances, the buy-out price paid to the withdrawing LLC member
might be grossly unfair and overstated without considering the value of the
intellectual and/or intangible value withdrawn by the dissociating LLC
member himself.179 The Comments to the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act appear to recognize the possibility of discounts other than the minority
discount and mention the key man discount.180 Indeed, such discounts may
be a critical way to arrive at an appropriate value in certain instances.
Finally, it seems reasonable that courts should have some discretion
regarding payments or payment terms within reason, to arrive at a fair
resolution, particularly where an equitable proceeding is involved.
REVISED UNIF. P‘SHIP. ACT § 701 (1997).
177. See Vuotto & Maier, supra note 157 (exploring what facts should constitute
extraordinary circumstances to give rise to the application of discounts in business
valuations).
178. However, one would expect that if the underlying valuation of the company is
properly done, such unique features already would be taken into account in the underlying
valuation of the company, making it unnecessary to again reflect the factors in the form of a
marketability discount.
179. Some courts, however, have taken the position that consideration of goodwill in the
valuation process is inappropriate because the goodwill belongs to the enterprise and is not
an asset belonging to the individual participant. See Brown v. Corrugated Box, Inc., 91 Cal.
App. 3d 477, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the loss of goodwill that would occur if
a controlling shareholder were to leave should not be considered in valuing a company upon
disassociation by minority shareholders).
180. REVISED
UNIF.
P‘SHIP.
ACT
§
701,
cmt3
(1997).
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uparta/1997act_final.htm.
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As indicated in Part IV.B, the ALI provides that in the corporate
arena, the marketability discount should be disallowed in the appraisal
remedy except in extraordinary cases.181 If without the marketability
discount there would be an unfair wealth transfer from the remaining
shareholders to the departing LLC member, it has been argued that the
marketability discount should apply.182 According to the ALI Comments,
this exception is limited to cases where a dissenting shareholder has held
out to exploit the transaction giving rise to the appraisal, so as to divert
value to his or her self at the expense of other shareholders.183 The ALI
Comment posits that a minority shareholder who exploits a relatively minor
certificate change can trigger an appraisal. The appraisal‘s fair value will
likely be higher than the company‘s fair market value, due to the
company‘s financially troubled, illiquid condition.184
Although the ALI Comment is somewhat obtuse, it appears to address
a situation involving bad faith or manipulation on the part of a minority.
Perhaps a similar type of manipulation could occur in connection with an
LLC. Some LLC statutes contain dissenter‘s rights.185 Perhaps a
manipulative minority LLC member could seek an appraisal to obtain a
higher buy-out price where the fair market value would be lower because,
for example, the LLC is operating under severe cash constraints. One
could posit a situation in which a minority LLC member attempts to exploit
an oppression remedy in bad faith in an effort to get cashed out quickly
prior to an upcoming sale that is likely to occur at a depressed price due to
possible managerial problems or other impediments that are not likely to be
reflected in an underlying formal valuation of the LLC. In such cases
involving bad faith manipulation, one approach might be to allow a
discount because of the extraordinary circumstances. The problem,
however, with creating this exception is the difficulty in defining
extraordinary circumstances and the potential for re-introducing the very
uncertainty that a general prohibition on discounts is intended to avoid.
An alternative approach might be to handle instances of bad
faith/misconduct through the imposition of punitive damages and/or to
181. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.22 (2010).
182. Advanced Commc‘n Design v. Follett, 615 N.W. 2d 285, 292 (Minn. 2000).
183. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.22, at cmt
e (2010).
184. See id.
185. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17604 (Deering 2010) (providing for dissenters‘ rights with
fair market value payment); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4352 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing for
appraisal rights subject to limitations); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-603(a) (2010) (providing
that the court may decree dissolution of a limited liability company); MINN. STAT. §
322B.386 (2007) (using the term fair value); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-54 (2010) (using the
term fair value); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.40, 1705.41 (LexisNexis 2010) (using the
term fair cash value); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.430 (2010) (using the term fair value).
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permit the award of court costs and attorney‘s fees. Counterclaims for
tortious conduct might also be justified in certain extreme cases.
Addressing misconduct through punitive damage awards, the award of
court costs, and/or through counterclaims may be more honest and
transparent than using a discount factor as a ―catch-all‖ adjustment to
punish one of the parties.186 For example, in Balsamides v. Protameen
Chems. Inc.,187 two fifty-percent owners of a corporation began feuding
when they brought their sons into their business.188 The feud degenerated
into physical violence.189 The case was an unusual one because Balsamides
was not a minority owner, yet was considered an oppressed shareholder
under New Jersey‘s applicable oppression statute. In an unusual twist, the
court ordered Balsamides, the oppressed party, to purchase the shares of
Perle, the other fifty-percent owner.190 The New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed the use of a marketability discount which had the effect of
lowering the price at which plaintiff was to purchase the defendant‘s stock.
The court in effect decided that it should take into account fairness and
equity and on that basis, it was equitable to give Balsamides a minority
discount in the price he should pay Perle.191
The Balsamides decision has been criticized for being inappropriately
punitive, and such criticism appears to be well-deserved.192
The
marketability discount should not be used as a punitive measure in an
indirect manner which in effect imposes hidden punitive damages. The
Minnesota Supreme Court has similarly struggled to define extraordinary
circumstances justifying a marketability discount in the context of
oppression.
In Advanced Communication Design v. Follett,193 the
Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the marketability discount should
apply to the corporation‘s buy-out of the minority shareholder. The
marketability discount was necessary to prevent an unfair transfer of wealth
to the minority shareholder.194 Without the marketability discount, the
186. See Mullenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A. 2d 1382, 1390 (N.J. 1996) (ordering the
minority to buy-out the majority). See also Moll, supra note 3, at 297 (discussing the
considerable disagreement regarding the appropriateness of a discount).
187. Balsamides v. Protameen Chems. Inc., 734 A.2d 721 (N.J. 1999)
188. Id. at 721-22.
189. Id. at 723-24.
190. Id. at 723. See also id. at 725-726 (discussing defendant‘s refusal to provide
technical information to customers, his refusal to stock inventory that plaintiff‘s customers
ordered, his sale of carbopol to his son in violation of a distribution agreement with a major
customer, and defendant‘s son‘s disparaging treatment of plaintiff intending to embarrass
plaintiff and harm his relationships with customers).
191. Vuotto and Maier, supra note 157.
192. Moll, supra note 3, at 297.
193. See Advanced Comm‘n Design v. Follett, 615 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. 2000)
(discussing the appropriateness of a marketability discount).
194. Id. at 285.
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valuation would have been more than five times the total net worth of the
corporation and seven times its average annual net income. 195 According to
the Minnesota Supreme Court, several factors should be considered in the
determination of whether extraordinary circumstances warrant the
marketability discount. Such factors include whether the buying or selling
shareholder has acted in a manner that is unfairly oppressive or has reduced
the value of the company, whether the oppressed shareholder has additional
remedies, and whether any condition of the buy-out, including price, would
be unfair to the remaining shareholders because it would be unduly
burdensome to the company.196
It is commendable that the court did not accept an obviously
misguided value for the business in question in Advanced Communication
Design. However, guidelines on the issue of valuation should not turn on
whether the controlling shareholder engaged in unfairly prejudicial
conduct. The nature and scope of the alleged oppressive conduct is
relevant to the question of whether the minority should be entitled to the
remedy of a judicial dissolution or buy-out, but should not have a bearing
on the valuation question.
Perhaps in substance, the court in Advanced Communication Design is
not really applying a discount as such, but rather is making its own
equitable adjustments based upon the facts and circumstances presented
and the parties‘ misconduct in the case. Such judicial adjustments could
inject an unfortunate degree of uncertainty and lack of predictability in the
valuation process that is particularly inappropriate for LLCs. As indicated
above, a more direct and honest approach to misconduct may be to seek
court costs, attorney‘s fees, and/or an award of punitive damages as an
offset to the purchase price, or to encourage a counterclaim for damages
where there has been tortious conduct or a breach of contract.
In summary, it is appropriate for the valuation of a privately-held
business to take into account special features that are unique to the
business, whether having to do with the age or quality of management,
unique contractual rights, or facts and circumstances dealing with goodwill.
If a minority investor is taking goodwill with him, the valuation of the
business should be adjusted accordingly. However, these sorts of
adjustments should not be made twice—first in the determination of the
underlying value of the business and then again by applying a discount.
Also, in an equitable proceeding, some judicial discretion in the interests of
fairness and equity may be appropriate regarding payment terms, etc.
However, a broad exception to the prohibition on the marketability
discount for ―extraordinary circumstances‖ is not recommended because it

195. Id. at 293-94.
196. Id.
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would reintroduce uncertainty in the LLC valuation process. It is true that
the objectives of fairness and equity should not be overlooked in
connection with valuations arising in oppression cases or divorce—
―leaving fairness out of the law is a little like asking Mrs. Lincoln if she
otherwise liked the show.‖197 However, if there has been bad faith, a
breach of contract, or tortious conduct, it should be dealt with
straightforwardly, and an award of compensatory and/or punitive damages
should be sought.
D.

Judicial Guidance Specific to the LLC

Many courts are likely to confront the minority discount dilemma as a
question of first impression when involving an LLC investor. In deciding
how to value the LLC investor‘s LLC interest, courts should first consider
the provisions contained in the LLC operating agreement given the
contractual mandate and contractual orientation of most LLC legislation.198
Many statutes expressly reflect a policy of giving maximum effect to the
terms of the LLC operating agreement.199 Absent fraud or bad faith or
other unforeseen special circumstances, courts should make every effort to
enforce the buy-out valuation terms contained in the LLC operating
agreement.200 Absent guidance from an LLC operating agreement, the
197. C.A.E. Goodhart, Economics, and the Law: Too Much One-Way Traffic? 60 MOD.
L. REV. 1, 12 (1997). See also Miller, supra note 152, at 1650 (citing Goodhart).
198. See Elf Atochem Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999) (emphasizing the
contractual policy underlying the Delaware LLC statute and the intent to give the parties the
discretion to contractually define their relationship). See also Am. Aglian Envtl. Techs. v.
Envtl. Mgmt. Corp., 412 F. 3d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that provisions in an
operating agreement are designed to achieve finality); Bootheel Ethanol Inv., LLC v. Semo
Ethanol Coop., No. 1:08CV59SNLJ, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at *7-9 (E.D. Mo. Feb.
17, 2009) (emphasizing the role of the contract).
199. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-108(4) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b)
(2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76, 134(b) (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-1201(2) (2010);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:78(II) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-66(a) (West 2010);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2058(D) (West 2010); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8913 (West
2010) (comment on paragraph 8); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1901 (LexisNexis 2010);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.800(2) (LexisNexis 2010).
200. Some state legislation expressly refers to the parties‘ relevant contractual
provisions. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-119 (2)(a) (2008) (―If the articles of
organization, a member-control agreement, or another agreement state a price for the
redemption or buyout of membership interests, the court shall order the sale for the price
and on the terms set forth, unless the court determines that the price or terms are
unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case.‖). See also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 180/35-65 (LexisNexis 2008) (indicating that the court should ―determine the fair
value of the interest, considering among other relevant evidence the going concern value of
the company, any agreement among some or all of the members fixing the price or
specifying a formula for determining value of distributional interests for any other purpose,
the recommendations of any appraiser appointed by the court, and any legal constraints on
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court should next consider whether the applicable LLC statute contains
valuation provisions that become operative in the absence of an operating
agreement. In interpreting buy-out language contained in the LLC statute,
prior interpretations under both the jurisdiction‘s corporate and/or
partnership statutes may be helpful.
As indicated earlier, except for California and Utah which expressly
state that the buyout of the LLC interest should be at fair market value,
most LLC statutes are silent as to how the dissociating member‘s interest
should be valued.201 Under these circumstances, courts should look to the
state‘s corporate oppression and dissenters‘ rights precedents as well as the
state‘s partnership dissociation provisions. It may be helpful to factor in
the policy reasons described above in support of a general prohibition of
the minority and marketability discounts in the oppression context and
possibly, in the divorce setting as well.202

the company‘s ability to purchase the interest‖); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.833 Sub. 2 (West
2010) (discussing the court‘s ability to, upon motion by a limited liability company or a
member, order a sale of membership interests).
201. See infra Appendix E.
202. See supra Part VI; Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d 486, 493 (8th Cir. 2001)
(finding that the lower court did not err in declining to apply a marketability discount);
Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank of Ashland Kansas, 992 P.2d 216 (Kan. 1999)
(indicating that fair value should be used and minority and marketability discounts not
applied in a case involving a reverse stock split that was deliberately designed to squeeze
out the minority shareholders because application of the discounts would have penalized the
minority and unfairly enriched the majority); Joseph W. Anthony & Karlyn V. Boraas,
Betrayed, Belittled . . . But Triumphant: Claims of Shareholders in Closely Held
Corporations, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1173, 1186 (1996) (discussing that there is no
ready market for closely held corporations); Marilyn B. Cane & Peter Ferola, An Appraisal
of “Fair Value” in the Revised Corporate Appraisal Statute Section 1.01, Model Business
Corporation Act, 30 NOVA L. REV. 333, 347 (2006) (arguing that the 1998 Revised Model
Corporation Act (RMBCA) indicates that discounts are inappropriate in appraisal
transactions as a whole in MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4) & cmt. 2); John C. Coates,
“Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict
Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (1999) (discussing the importance and
unpredictability of the minority discount); Harry J. Haynsworth, Valuation of Business
Interests, 33 MERCER L. REV. 457, 459 (1982) (showing that in an oppression setting there is
no willing seller and buyer); William S. Monnin-Browder, Are Discounts Appropriate?:
Valuing Shares in Close Corporations for the Purpose of Remedying Breach of Fiduciary
Duty Under Massachusetts Law, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 723, 734 (2007) (discussing several
rationales offered by courts in rejecting application of discounts); Barry M. Wertheimer, The
Shareholders Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613,
636-37 (1998) (discussing the unreliability of market price due to fluctuations and
susceptibility to manipulation by insiders or majority shareholders).
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VI. LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS: THE PURCHASE IN LIEU OF
DISSOLUTION
To facilitate the efficient resolution of LLC member disputes, it is
suggested that LLC judicial dissolution provisions be amended to include a
buyout option in lieu of a judicial dissolution of the entity. This
amendment would harmonize LLC provisions with many corporate
oppression statutes.203 Such a provision should be incorporated into the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Statute.204 In addition, states should
consider harmonizing the valuation language among their partnership,
corporate, and LLC statutes. The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws has recently begun a project to harmonize business
entity legislation.205 A review of LLC and corporate judicial dissolution
provisions reveals that most LLC statutes do not contain provisions for a
buyout in lieu of a judicial dissolution and many are silent with regard to
how a valuation would proceed if a buyout were to occur.206
In many of the states in which the LLC statute is silent regarding
valuation, there are corporate statutes that do address valuation in corporate
dissolution provisions and/or corporate dissenters‘ rights provisions. It
would be helpful to courts if legislatures rationalized these differences. A
number of states such as Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa,
Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and West
Virginia have an express LLC judicial dissolution that does not authorize a
buyout in lieu of a judicial dissolution. These states, however, do have
corporate mechanisms that offer a buyout at ―fair value‖ in lieu of a judicial
dissolution.207
Minnesota and North Dakota are in the minority by having consistent
LLC and corporate provisions that offer a buyout at fair value in lieu of
judicial dissolution. Such symmetry is usually lacking. The Utah LLC
statute uses ―fair market value‖ in its LLC statute governing the purchase
203. See infra Appendix D. Harry Haynsworth IV, Chair of the Harmonization
Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, has long
recommended this type of buyout in lieu of dissolution provisions. See NAT‘L CONF. OF
COMM‘RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HARMONIZED BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS ACT (2011),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/hobe/2011jan_huba.pdf (proposing a
harmonized single code of entity laws).
204. Although the Uniform Limited Liability Company Statute includes a judicial
dissolution provision triggering a right to a judicial dissolution in the event of unfairly
prejudicial or oppressive conduct, it does not include an express mechanism authorizing a
buyout in lieu of a judicial dissolution.
205. NAT‘L CONF. OF COMM‘RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HARMONIZED BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS
ACT,
available
at
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/CommitteeSearchResults.aspx?committee=336.
206. See infra Appendix E.
207. Id.
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of an LLC interest in lieu of a dissolution, but uses ―fair value‖ in
comparable corporate provisions and in its corporate appraisal statute.208
As in Florida, different statutory language governing judicial dissolutions
may appear in corporate and LLC statutes and still other statutory valuation
formulations may appear in the state‘s corporate statutory appraisal
provisions. I suggest that legislators compare buyout provisions in a state‘s
corporate appraisal provisions, corporate dissolution provisions, and in
partnership statutes.
In addition, the judicial dissolution provisions of the Revised Model
Business Corporation Statute and the Revised Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act should be revisited. As already mentioned, the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act provides for a buyout at fair value in lieu
of a dissolution, whereas the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Act does
not.209 Purchase in lieu of dissolution is a highly desirable provision
because it holds the promise of reducing complex and protracted litigation
leading up to the buyout. Given the policy analyses offered above, I
suggest that the Revised Model Business Corporation Act and the Revised
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act should be harmonized to prohibit
the minority and marketability discounts generally, subject to an exception
for the marketability discount in extraordinary instances—an approach that
would be largely consistent with the ALI and the UPA.
All members of the legal community, whether legislators, lawyers, or
courts, should be mindful that creditors and the public at large have vested
interests in the financial vitality of privately-owned businesses and the
timely and successful resolution of internal disputes. The latest financial
crisis highlights the interrelatedness of business enterprises and the degree
to which the health of one business can affect that of another. Swift and
viable buyout arrangements are in the best interest of all stakeholders in the
economy. Some legislation has attempted to encourage flexible buyout
terms by authorizing courts to provide for installment sales where it is in
the interest of equity to do so.210 Further, it may be helpful to incorporate
language that awards reasonable attorneys fees and the fees of appraisers or
other experts where one of the parties has acted arbitrarily or not in good
faith. The statutory authorization of punitive damages may be another tool

208. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2C-1214 (LexisNexis 2010) (applying ―fair market
value‖ in elections to purchase in lieu of dissolution of an LLC) with UTAH CODE ANN. § 1610a-1434 (LexisNexis 2010) (applying ―fair value‖ in comparable provision).
209. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701(a)(5), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ullca/2006act_final.htm
(providing
for
dissolution upon application by a member).
210. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-32-119(2) (2010) (providing for the court to use
equitable discretion in determining an installment payment schedule where parties have
failed to agree).
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to deter obstructionist or deceptive conduct that unnecessarily prolongs and
complicates disputes arising in the divorce or oppression contexts.211
VII. CONCLUSION
Against the backdrop of soaring LLC filings, judicial and legislative
guidelines are needed to determine the value of an LLC interest in
controversies involving LLC dissenters‘ rights, LLC oppression cases, and
in suits for an equitable distribution of property. There is a split of
authority in valuation guidelines under the Model Business Corporation
Act on one hand, and under the American Principles of Corporate
Governance and the Uniform Partnership Act on the other. This article
argues that the minority discount should be disregarded in LLC oppression
and dissenters‘ rights cases because such buyouts are coercive, there is a
need to deter oppressive majority conduct, and the minority discount injects
uncertainty into the valuation process. The goal of such buyouts is not to
closely simulate a market sale, but rather, to provide a sensible remedy for
the deprivation of an investment that the LLC owner would have otherwise
continued to own. The need to deter oppressive conduct by a prohibition of
the minority discount is lacking in the divorce context, but the uncertainty
problem is present in divorce as well as in oppression contexts. Similarly,
the marketability discount should be disregarded as a general rule in
oppression cases and in divorce contexts to prevent double-counting the
impact of a restricted market, to avoid under-compensating the active
minority or the spouse of a minority owner, and to preclude market-related
adjustments for family firms to which outside markets are largely
irrelevant.
Although adjustments to value appear appropriate in
recognition of the unique characteristics of management and to reflect the
specific facts and circumstances surrounding goodwill, such adjustments
should not be made twice—first when valuing the underlying business and
then again through a discount. Judicial discretion to achieve reasonable
and equitable payment terms may be appropriate in an equitable
proceeding; however, a broadly-conceived exception for a marketability
discount based on ―extraordinary circumstances‖ is not recommended.
211. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-1-701 (2010) (providing for the award of reasonable
attorney‘s fees and the fees and other expenses of appraiser or other experts in the amount
the court finds equitable against the party who has acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in
good faith). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73 (2010) (providing for award of reasonable
attorney‘s fees and other expenses for circumstances matching the statutory language of
Tennessee); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.05.250 (2010) (providing for the award of reasonable
attorney‘s fees and other expenses for circumstances matching the statutory language of
Tennessee); W. VA. CODE § 47B-7-1 (LexisNexis 2009) (providing for award of reasonable
attorney‘s fees and other expenses for circumstances matching the statutory language of
Tennessee).
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Counterclaims for tortious conduct, the award of punitive damages, and a
demand for court costs or attorney‘s fees may be an important way of
deterring bad faith and/or opportunistic conduct on either side of a divorce
or oppression action. The award of punitive damages or a well-fashioned
counterclaim for tortious conduct may provide a more appropriate and
transparent means of addressing misconduct than a hazy application of a
―catch-all‖ marketability discount. Specific statutory recommendations
should be considered to rationalize differences among partnership,
corporate, and LLC statutes and to deter bad faith and obstructive or
deceptive conduct.
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APPENDIX A
LLC Statutes Nationwide
STATE

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Alabama

ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp.
2004)
ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.010–.995 (2004)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 29-601 to -857 (LexisNexis 1998 &
Supp. 2007)
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to -1401 (2001 & Supp.
2005)
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000–17656 (Deering 2006 & Supp.
2008)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-101 to -1101 (West 2007)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-100 to -242 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2006)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1109 (2005 & Supp.
2006)
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1001 to -1075 (LexisNexis 2001 &
Supp. 2007)
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401–.705 (West 2007 & Supp.
2008)
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-100 to -1109 (2003 & Supp. 2005)
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 428-101 to -1302 (2004 & Supp. 2007)
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§30-6-101 to -1104 (LexisNexis 2010)
effective after 7/1/10, subject to transition rules; formerly
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 53-601 to -672 (2000 & Supp. 2005)
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-1 to /60-1 (West 2004 &
Supp. 2007)
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 to -13-1 (LexisNexis 1999 &
Supp. 2005)
IOWA CODE ANN. §§489.101-.1304 (LexisNexis 2010)
adopting the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act; formerly IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.100–.1601 (West
1999 & Supp. 2007)(2)
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7662 to -76,142 (Supp. 2006)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.001–.540 (West 2006 & Supp.
2007)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301–:1369 (1994 & Supp.
2008)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 601–762 (1996 & Supp.
2007)

Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho

Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
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Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
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MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. ASSN‘S §§ 4A-101 to 1103
(LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2005)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156C, §§ 1–69 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2007)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4101-.5200 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2007)
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.01-.960 (West 2004 & Supp.
2008)
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-101 to -127 (LexisNexis 2010)
effective from and after Jan. 1, 2010; see also MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 79-29-101 to -1204 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007)
effective until Jan 1, 2011
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.010-.740 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008)
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to -1307 (2005)
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2601 to -2653 (Reissue 1989 &
Cum. Supp. 2006)
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 86.011–.590 (2007)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:1-:85, §§ 304-D:1-:20
(LexisNexis 2005)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-1 to -70 (West 2004)
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-1 to -74 (LexisNexis 2001 &
Supp. 2005)
N.Y.LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW §§ 101 to 1403 (McKinney 2007
& Supp. 2008)
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (2003)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -156 (2007)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.01 – .58 (LexisNexis 2001)
OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 2000 to 2060 (West 1999 & Supp.
2007)
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 63.001-.990 (2003)
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8901 to 8998 (West 1995 &
Supp. 2007)
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-1 to -75 (1999 & Supp. 2005)
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-44-101 to -1208 (2006 & Supp.
2007)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-34A-101 to -1207 (2007)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-249-101 to -48-249-1133
(LexisNexis 2010)
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001–.552 (Vernon
2007)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2C-101 to -1902 (2002 & Supp.
2005)
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VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3001 to 3184 (2007)
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1123 (1999 & Supp. 2005)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 25.15.005-.902 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2007)
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31B-1-101 to -13-1306 (LexisNexis
2003 & Supp. 2005)
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0102–.1305 (West 2002 & Supp.
2007)
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -147 (2007); see also
Wyoming Close Limited Liability Company Supplement 1725-101 to -111 (LexisNexis 2010)
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APPENDIX B
LLC Dissolution in Event of Deadlock, Oppressive Behavior or Other
Stated Misconduct
STATE

STATUTORY PROVISION

Arizona

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 29-785 A.2-A4 cmt. A (LexisNexis
2007) Comment a *
CAL. CORP. CODE 17351(a)(2), (4), (5) (LexisNexis 2007)
Comment b *
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.449(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2007) Comment c
HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-801(E) (LexisNexis 2007)
Comment d *
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-701(e)(2009) *
IOWA CODE ANN. § 489.701(e)(2009) *
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/35-1(4)(E) (LexisNexis 2007)
Comment f *
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-76,117 (LexisNexis 2007) Comment g
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §702(2007) Comment h
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4802 & 450.4803 (West 2007)
Comment i
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.833 (LexisNexis 2006) Comment j
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-802(b) (LexisNexis 2007)
Comment k *
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.143(1) (LexisNexis 2007) Comment l *
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-902(1)(e) (2005) Comment d *
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:51 (LexisNexis 2007)
Comment m
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-6-02 (2008) Comment n
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-119 (2007) Comment o
OR. REV. STAT. 63.661(1)(2005) Comment p
S.C. CODE ANN. §33-44-801 (LexisNexis 2006) Comment q *
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-34A-801(a)(4)(iv) (LexisNexis
2007) Comment d *
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-249-616 (LexisNexis 2008)
Comment r
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-1210 (LexisNexis 2007)
Comment s *
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3001 (5)(E) (LexisNexis 2007)
Comment d *
W.VA. CODE §§ 31B-1-801(b)(5)(v) (LexisNexis 2007)
Comment d *
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0902(4) (LexisNexis 2006) Comment d
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-29-701 (2007) Comment t *

California
Florida
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Illinois
Kansas
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
New Hampshire
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oregon
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee *
Utah
Vermont
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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* Also contains not reasonably practicable language
a. Agreement can alter; deadlock, illegal or fraudulent behavior,
waste, misapplication or diversion of assets.
b. Reasonably necessary for protection of rights of complaining
members; persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement, or abuse
of authority. Excludes term ―oppressive.‖
c. Deadlock, misappropriation or waste of assets. Excludes term
―oppressive.‖
d. Illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial.
e. Deadlock, illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent and irreparable injury
suffered or threatened.
f. Illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct.
g. Irreparable harm, deadlock language.
h. Deadlock, illegal or fraudulent conduct, misapplication or waste of
assets, abandonment of business.
i. Whenever company is unable to carry on business in conformity
with articles or operating agreement. Where Procured articles by
fraud, repeatedly and willfully exceed authority, conduct business
unlawfully; statute doesn‘t exclude other statutory or common law
grounds for dissolution.
j. Governors or those in control acted fraudulently, illegally, or
unfairly prejudicial in capacities as members or governors or as
managers or employees of a closely held LLC, an LLC having no
more than 35 members as defined per 322B.03.
k. Knowingly countenanced persistent and pervasive fraud, abuse of
authority, persistent unfairness toward any member, or
misapplication or waste of property.
l. Procured articles through fraud, exceeded legal authority,
conducted business in fraudulent or illegal manner, abuse of
powers contrary to public policy.
m. Deadlock and irreparable damage or affairs no longer conducted to
company‘s advantage or procured articles through fraud, exceeded
legal authority, committed violation that forfeits certificate,
conducted business in fraudulent or illegal manner, or abuse of
powers contrary to public policy.
n. Deadlock and irreparable injury, or deadlock and business no
longer conducted to the advantage of members, liquidation
necessary to protect rights of complaining member, assets
misapplied or wasted, or articles or LLC agreement entitle
complaining members to the dissolution.
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o. Deadlock, fraudulent, illegal, or unfairly prejudicial conduct as
managers or employees of a closely held LLC, or divided and
failure to elect successors, misapplication or waste of assets;
closely held LLC defined as a company that does not have more
than 35 members per 10-32-02.
p. Obtained articles by fraud, exceed or abuse authority, or not
reasonably practicable.
q. Event makes it unlawful to continue, or decree that economic
purpose frustrated, another‘s conduct makes it not reasonably
practicable to carry on, it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to
carry on, unlawful, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial
conduct.
r. Misconduct is not identified but court is given power to grant
equitable relief it considers just and reasonable in the
circumstances and/or may direct the dissolved entity be merged
into another or a new entity on terms and conditions it deems
equitable.
s. Obtained articles by fraud, exceed authority, violate a law that
forfeits charter, carry on business in a persistently fraudulent or
illegal manner, abuse of powers, fail to amend articles as required,
deadlock, and irreparable injury or affairs no longer conducted to
advantage of members, or deadlock for at least 6 months; managers
or those in control acting illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent;
misapplication or waste of assets, creditor provision. Election to
purchase in lieu of dissolution at 48-2C-1214.
t. Applies to LLCs that have not elected to be a closely held LLC
under Wyoming‘s Close Limited Liability Company Supplement.
LLCs that have elected close LLC status, dissolution occurs only
upon the expiration of the period fixed for the duration of the
company, the unanimous agreement of all members, or upon the
occurrence of events specified in the operating agreement. WYO.
STAT. 17-25-108 (2010).
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APPENDIX C
Judicial Dissolution Where Not Reasonably Practicable to Carry on
Business
STATE

STATUTORY PROVISION

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii

ALA. CODE ANN. § 10-12-38 (LexisNexis 2007)
ALASKA CODE § 10.50.405 (LexisNexis 2007)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-785 A.1. (LexisNexis 2007)
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-902 (LexisNexis 2007)
CAL. CORP. CODE § 17351(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2007)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-810 (LexisNexis 2007)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-207 (West 2007)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-802 (LexisNexis 2007)
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1048 (LexisNexis 2007)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.441(3) (LexisNexis 2007)
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-603(a) (LexisNexis 2007)
HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 23A §§ 428-801(4)(A),(B), and (C)
(LexisNexis 2007) Comment a
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/35-1(4)(A)-(C)(LexisNexis
2007) Comment a
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-9-2 (LexisNexis 2007)
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-701(d) (2009)
IOWA CODE ANN. §489.701(1)(d)(2) (2009)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.290 (LexisNexis 2007)
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12:1335 (2007)
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. ASS‘NS §§ 4A-903 (LexisNexis
2007)
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C, §44 (LexisNexis 2007)
Comment b
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4802 (West 2007)
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-802(a) (LexisNexis 2007)
MO. ANN. STAT. § 347.143(2) (LexisNexis 2007)
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-902 (1)(c) (2007)
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-2622(2) (LexisNexis 2007)
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.495 (LexisNexis 2007)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-49 (LexisNexis 2007)
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-40 (LexisNexis 2007)
N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW §702 (McKinney 2007)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.47 (LexisNexis 2007)
OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 2038 (LexisNexis 2007)
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 63.661(2) (2005)

Illinois
Indiana
Idaho
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
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South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
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Wyoming
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15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8972 (LexisNexis 2006)
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-40 (2007)
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-44-801(4)(c) (LexisNexis 2006)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-34A-801(4)(i)-(iii)
(LexisNexis 2007)
TENN. CODE ANN § 48-249-617 (LexisNexis 2008)
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 11.314(2) (LexisNexis
2007)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2C-1210(2)(e) (LexisNexis
2007)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §3101(5)(c) (LexisNexis 2007)
Comment c
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1047 (LexisNexis 2007)
WASH. REV. CODE. §§ 25.15.275 (LexisNexis 2008)
Comment d
W.VA. CODE §§ 31B-8-801(b)(5)(i),(ii), and (iii)
(LexisNexis 2007) Comment a
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0902(1) (LexisNexis 2006)
WYO. STAT. §§ 17-29-701 (2010) Comment e

a. Economic purpose unreasonably frustrated, another member makes
it not reasonably practical to continue, or it is not otherwise
reasonably practical to continue. Note that West Virginia also gives
certain rights to transferees.
b. Not reasonably practicable to carry on in conformity with articles of
organization or agreement.
c. Economic purpose unreasonably frustrated; not otherwise
practicable to carry on.
d. Not reasonably practicable to carry on in conformity with agreement
or other circumstances render dissolution equitable.
e. Applies to LLCs that have not elected to be a closely held LLC
under Wyoming‘s Close Limited Liability Company Supplement.
For LLCs that have elected close LLC status, dissolution occurs
only upon the expiration of the period fixed for the duration of the
company, the unanimous agreement of all members, or upon the
occurrence of events specified in the operating agreement. WYO.
STAT. §§ 17-25-108 (2010).
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APPENDIX D
§ 14.34. Election to Purchase in Lieu of Dissolution.
(a) In a proceeding under section 14.30(2) to dissolve a corporation that has no
shares listed on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a market
maintained by one or more members of a national or affiliated securities
association, the corporation may elect or, if it fails to elect, one or more
shareholders may elect to purchase all shares owned by the petitioning shareholder
at the fair value of the shares. An election pursuant to this section shall be
irrevocable unless the court determines that it is equitable to set aside or modify
the election.
(b) An election to purchase pursuant to this section may be filed with the court at
any time within 90 days after the filing of the petition under section 14.30(2) or at
such later time as the court in its discretion may allow. If the election to purchase
is filed by one or more shareholders, the corporation shall, within 10 days
thereafter, give written notice to all shareholders, other than the petitioner. The
notice must state the name and number of shares owned by the petitioner and the
name and number of shares owned by each electing shareholder and must advise
the recipients of their right to join in the election to purchase shares in accordance
with this section. Shareholders who wish to participate must file notice of their
intention to join in the purchase no later than 30 days after the effective date of the
notice to them. All shareholders who have filed an election or notice of their
intention to participate in the election to purchase thereby become parties to the
proceeding and shall participate in the purchase in proportion to their ownership of
shares as of the date the first election was filed, unless they otherwise agree or the
court otherwise directs. After an election has been filed by the corporation or one
or more shareholders, the proceeding under section 14.30(2) may not be
discontinued or settled, nor may the petitioning shareholder sell or otherwise
dispose of his shares, unless the court determines that it would be equitable to the
corporation and the shareholders, other than the petitioner, to permit such
discontinuance, settlement, sale, or other disposition.
(c) If, within 60 days of the filing of the first election, the parties reach agreement
as to the fair value and terms of purchase of the petitioner‘s shares, the court shall
enter an order directing the purchase of petitioner‘s shares upon the terms and
conditions agreed to by the parties.
(d) If the parties are unable to reach an agreement as provided for in subsection (c),
the court, upon application of any party, shall stay the section 14.30(2) proceedings
and determine the fair value of the petitioner‘s shares as of the day before the date
on which the petition under section 14.30(2) was filed or as of such other date as
the court deems appropriate under the circumstances.
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(e) Upon determining the fair value of the shares, the court shall enter an order
directing the purchase upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
appropriate, which may include payment of the purchase price in installments,
where necessary in the interest of equity, provision for security to assure payment
of the purchase price and any additional costs, fees, and expenses as may have
been awarded, and, if the shares are to be purchased by shareholders, the allocation
of shares among them. In allocating petitioner‘s shares among holders of different
classes of shares, the court should attempt to preserve the existing distribution of
voting rights among holders of different classes insofar as practicable and may
direct that holders of a specific class or classes shall not participate in the purchase.
Interest may be allowed at the rate and from the date determined by the court to be
equitable, but if the court finds that the refusal of the petitioning shareholder to
accept an offer of payment was arbitrary or otherwise not in good faith, no interest
shall be allowed. If the court finds that the petitioning shareholder had probable
grounds for relief under paragraphs (ii) or (iv) of section 14.30(2), it may award to
the petitioning shareholder reasonable fees and expenses of counsel and of any
experts employed by him.
(f) Upon entry of an order under subsections (c) or (e), the court shall dismiss the
petition to dissolve the corporation under section 14.30, and the petitioning
shareholder shall no longer have any rights or status as a shareholder of the
corporation, except the right to receive the amounts awarded to him by the order of
the court which shall be enforceable in the same manner as any other judgment.
(g) The purchase ordered pursuant to subsection (e), shall be made within 10 days
after the date the order becomes final unless before that time the corporation files
with the court a notice of its intention to adopt articles of dissolution pursuant to
sections 14.02 and 14.03, which articles must then be adopted and filed within 50
days thereafter. Upon filing of such articles of dissolution, the corporation shall be
dissolved in accordance with the provisions of section 14.05 through 14.07, and
the order entered pursuant to subsection (e) shall no longer be of any force or
effect, except that the court may award the petitioning shareholder reasonable fees
and expenses in accordance with the provisions of the last sentence of subsection
(e) and the petitioner may continue to pursue any claims previously asserted on
behalf of the corporation.
(h) Any payment by the corporation pursuant to an order under subsections (c) or
(e), other than an award of fees and expenses pursuant to subsection (e), is subject
to the provisions of section 6.40.
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APPENDIX E
LLC, Corporate, and Partnership Statutes Authorizing a Judicial
Dissolution

STATE

Alabama LLC

JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION
AUTHORIZED BUT
SILENT ON BUY-OUT

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
MARKET VALUE” OR
CONTAINING OTHER
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
VALUE”

ALA. CODE ANN. § 10-12-38
(LexisNexis 2007)

Alabama

ALA. CODE § 10-2B-14.30

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2007)

Alabama

ALA. CODE § 10A-8-

Partnership

7.01 (effective Jan 1,
2011). Departs from
RUPA language,
providing for a buyout
at ―fair value.‖

Alaska LLC

ALASKA CODE § 10.50.405
(LexisNexis 2007)

Alaska Corporate

ALASKA CODE §
10.06.628 (LexisNexis
2008) and 10.06.630
(LexisNexis 2008)**

Alaska

ALASKA CODE § 32.06.70

Partnership

(2010)
Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout at greater of the
liquidation value or the amount
distributable to the dissociating
partner had the partnership
been sold without dissociating
partner.

Arizona LLC

Ariz. Rev. Stat
Ann. § 29-785 A.1-A.4

Arizona

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-

Corporate

1430 & §10.1434
(LexisNexis 2008)
Authorizes buyout but
doesn‘t specify the
value.
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DISSOLUTION
AUTHORIZED BUT
SILENT ON BUY-OUT

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
MARKET VALUE” OR
CONTAINING OTHER
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE
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BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
VALUE”

Arizona
Partnership
Arkansas LLC

ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-902
(LexisNexis 2007)

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1430

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2008)

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-46-701

Partnership

(2009)
Other Language:
Follows RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout at greater of the
liquidation value or the amount
distributable to the dissociating
partner had the partnership
been sold as a going concern
without the dissociating
partner.

California LLC

CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §
17351 & § 17604 (2010)

California

Cal. Corp. Code

Corporate

§ 1800 & 2000**

California

CAL. CORP. CODE § 16701

Partnership

(Deering 2009)
Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout at greater of the
liquidation value or the amount
distributable to the dissociating
partner had the partnership
been sold as a going concern
without dissociated partner.

Colorado LLC

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 780-810 (LexisNexis 2007)

Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-114-

Corporate

301 (LexisNexis 2007)

Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-64-701

Partnership

(2009)
Buyout price is the amount
equal to the value of the
partner‘s interest.
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JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION
AUTHORIZED BUT
SILENT ON BUY-OUT

Connecticut LLC

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
MARKET VALUE” OR
CONTAINING OTHER
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE

665

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
VALUE”

207 (West 2007)
Connecticut

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

Corporate

§ 33-900 (West
2008)**

Connecticut

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 34-

Partnership

362(2009)
Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout at greater of the
liquidation value or the amount
distributable to the dissociating
partner had the partnership
been sold as a going concern
without the dissociated partner.

Delaware LLC

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18802

Delaware

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 273

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2008)

Delaware

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §

Partnership

15-701 (2010) Buyout
at fair value of such
partner‘s economic
interest as of the date of
dissociation based on
the partner‘s right to
share in distributions.

District of

D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-1048

Columbia LLC

(LexisNexis 2008)

District of

D.C.CODE ANN. § 29-101.88

Columbia

(LexisNexis 2008)

Corporate
District of

D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-107.01

Columbia

(2010). Other Language:

Partnership

Follows RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout at greater of the
liquidation value or the amount
distributable to the dissociating
partner had the partnership
been sold as a going concern
without dissociating partner.
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Florida LLC

JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION
AUTHORIZED BUT
SILENT ON BUY-OUT

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
MARKET VALUE” OR
CONTAINING OTHER
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE

[Vol. 13:3

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
VALUE”

FLA. STAT. ANN. §
608.449(2)(a)-(b) *

Florida Corporate

Fla. Stat. Ann.
§§ 607.1430, 607.1434,
and 607.1436(2010) *

Florida

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.8701

Partnership

(2010)
Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout at greater of the
liquidation value or the amount
distributable to the dissociating
partner had the partnership
been sold as a going concern
without dissociated partner.

Georgia LLC

GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11603(a) (LexisNexis 2007)
But see GA. CODE ANN. § 1411-1108 (2008) Provides
Dissenters‘ Rights at fair
value.

Georgia

GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1430

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2008)

Georgia

GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-42

Partnership

(2010)
Other Language:
―The withdrawn partner or
legal representative . . . shall
receive . . . an amount equal to
the value of his interest.‖

Hawaii LLC

HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 23A, §§
428-801 (LexisNexis 2008)

Hawaii Corporate

HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 23,
§§ 411-414 & 414-415
(LexisNexis 2008) **
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JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION
AUTHORIZED BUT
SILENT ON BUY-OUT

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
MARKET VALUE” OR
CONTAINING OTHER
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE

Hawaii

HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 23, § 425-

Partnership

133 (LexisNexis 2010)

667

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
VALUE”

Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout at greater of the
liquidation value or the amount
distributable to the dissociating
partner had the partnership
been sold as a going concern
without dissociated partner.
Idaho LLC

ID CODE ANN. §§ 53-643
(2008)

Idaho Corporate

ID CODE ANN. §S 30-11430 & §30-1-1434
(LexisNexis 2008) **

Idaho Partnership

ID CODE ANN. § 53-3-701
(2010)
Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout at greater of the
liquidation value or the amount
distributable to the dissociating
partner had the partnership
been sold as a going concern
without dissociated partner.

Illinois LLC

805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. §§ 180/35-60 &
180/35-65 (LexisNexis
2008)**
Allows for reasonable
expenses if arbitrary,
vexatious or conduct
not in good faith.

Illinois Corporate

805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. §§ 5/12.55 &
5/12.56 (LexisNexis
2008) *****
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BUY-OUT AT
“FAIR VALUE”

Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout at greater of the
liquidation value or the
amount distributable to the
dissociating partner had
the partnership been sold
as a going concern without
dissociated partner.

Illinois
Partnership

Indiana LLC

4/28/2011 7:33 PM

IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-2
(LexisNexis 2008)

Indiana

IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-47-1

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2008)

IND. CODE ANN. § 23-4-142 (2010)
Unif. P‘ship Act
Other Language: Upon
retirement or death . . .
right to the ―value of his
interest.‖

Indiana
Partnership

Iowa LLC

IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.1302
(LexisNexis 2008)

IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 490.1430 &
490/1434 (2008) **

Iowa
Corporate

IOWA CODE ANN. §
486A.701(2010)
Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout at greater of the
liquidation value or the
amount distributable to the
dissociating partner had
the partnership been sold
as a going concern without
dissociated partner.

Iowa
Partnership

Kansas LLC

KANSAS STAT. ANN. §§ 17-76, 117
(LexisNexis 2008)

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6808

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2007) General
authority to dissolve but no specific
oppression or deadlock triggers.
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JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION
AUTHORIZED BUT
SILENT ON BUY-OUT

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
MARKET VALUE” OR
CONTAINING OTHER BUYOUT LANGUAGE

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-701

Partnership

(2009). Other Language:
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BUY-OUT AT
“FAIR VALUE”

Follows RUPA §7.01.
Buyout at greater of the
liquidation value or the amount
distributable to the dissociating
partner had the partnership been
sold as a going concern without
dissociated partner.
Kentucky LLC

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
275.290 (LexisNexis 2008)

Kentucky

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.355

Corporate

271B.14-300 (LexisNexis

(2010)

2008)
Kentucky

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.355

Partnership

(2010). Other Language: Upon
retirement or death . . . right to
the ―value of his interest.‖

Louisiana LLC

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12:1335 (LexisNexis 2008)

Louisiana

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:143

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2008)

Maine LLC

ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31, § 702
(LexisNexis 2008)

ME. REV. STAT. tit.
13-C, § 1430
(LexisNexis 2008)
and ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 13-C
§1434 (LexisNexis
2008) ***

Maine Corporate

Maine Partnership

ME. REV. STAT.tit. 31 §1071
(2009). Other Language:
Follows RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout at greater of the
liquidation value or the amount
distributable to the dissociating
partner had the partnership been
sold as a going concern without
dissociated partner.
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STATE

Maryland LLC

JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION
AUTHORIZED BUT
SILENT ON BUY-OUT

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
MARKET VALUE” OR
CONTAINING OTHER BUYOUT LANGUAGE

MD. CODE ANN. § 4A-903
(LexisNexis 2008)

Maryland

MD. CODE ANN. § 3-413

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2008)
MD. CODE ANN. § 9A-701
(2010)
Other Language: Follows RUPA
§ 7.01.
Buyout greater of the liquidation
value or the amount
distributable to the dissociating
partner had the partnership been
sold as a going concern without
dissociated partner.

Massachusetts

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C,

LLC

§ 44 (LexisNexis 2008)

Massachusetts

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156D,

Corporate

§ 14.30 (LexisNexis 2008)

Massachusetts

MASS. ANN. LAWSch. 108A §

Partnership

42 (2010)
Other Language:
Upon retirement or death ―right
to the value of his interest.‖

Michigan LLC

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
450.4802 (LexisNexis 2008)

Michigan

MICH. COMP. LAWS §

Corporate

450.1823 (LexisNexis 2008)

Michigan

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 449.42

Partnership

(2010)
Other Language: Retiring or
deceased partner entitled to the
―value of his interest.‖
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BUY-OUT AT
“FAIR VALUE”
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ON BUY-OUT

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
MARKET VALUE” OR
CONTAINING OTHER
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE

Minnesota LLC

671

BUY-OUT AT
“FAIR VALUE”
MINN. STAT. ANN. §
322B.833 (LexisNexis
2008)**
See also § 322B.386
(2007)
Provides Dissenters‘
Rights at fair value.

Minnesota

MINN. STAT. ANN. §

Corporate

302A.751 (LexisNexis
2007)**

Minnesota

MINN. STAT. ANN. §

Partnership

323A.0701 (2009)
Other Language:
Follows RUPA § 7.01. Buyout
greater of the liquidation value
or the amount distributable to
the dissociating partner had the
partnership been sold as a
going concern without
dissociated partner.

Mississippi LLC

MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-802
(LexisNexis 2008)

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN. §

Corporate

79-4-14.34
(LexisNexis 2008)**

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-13-701

Partnership

(2010)
Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout greater of the
liquidation value or the
amount distributable to the
dissociating partner had the
partnership been sold as a
going concern without
dissociated partner.

Missouri LLC

MO. ANN. STAT. § 347.143
(LexisNexis 2008)

Missouri

MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.494

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2008)
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JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT
ON BUY-OUT

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
MARKET VALUE” OR
CONTAINING OTHER
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE

Missouri

MO. ANN. STAT. § 358.420

Partnership

(2010)

[Vol. 13:3

BUY-OUT AT
“FAIR VALUE”

Other Language: Retiring or
deceased partner entitled to the
value of his interest.
Montana LLC

MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-902
(LexisNexis 2008)

Montana

MONT. CODE ANN. §§

Corporate

35-1-938 & §35-1-939
(LexisNexis 2008) **

Montana

MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-

Partnership

619 (2009)
Formulation Similar to That in
Fed. Income Tax Reg.
20.2031-3: Buy out at greater
of liquidation value or value
based on sale of entire
business as going concern with
selling price determined on the
basis of the amount that would
be paid by a willing buyer to a
willing seller, neither being
under any compulsion to buy
or sell, and with knowledge of
relevant fact.

Nebraska LLC

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 212622 (LexisNexis 2008)

Nebraska

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-

Corporate

20,162 (LexisNexis 2008)

Nebraska

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 67-434

Other Language: Follows

Partnership

(LexisNexis 2010)

RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout greater of the
liquidation value or the
amount distributable to the
dissociating partner had the
partnership been sold as a
going concern without
dissociated partner.

Nevada LLC

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.495
(LexisNexis 2008)

MILLERFINALIZED_TWO (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

4/28/2011 7:33 PM

DISCOUNTS AND BUYOUTS

STATE

JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT
ON BUY-OUT

Nevada Corporate

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-605

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
MARKET VALUE” OR
CONTAINING OTHER
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE

673

BUY-OUT AT
“FAIR VALUE”

(LexisNexis 2008)
Generalized court authority.
Nevada

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §

Partnership

87.4346 (2009)
Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout greater of the
liquidation value or the
amount distributable to the
dissociating partner had the
partnership been sold as a
going concern without
dissociated partner.

New Hampshire

N.H.REV. STAT. ANN. § 304:C-

LLC

51 (LexisNexis 2008)

New Hampshire

N.H.REV. STAT. ANN.

Corporate

§§ 293-A:14:30 &
14.34 (LexisNexis
2008)**

New Hampshire

N.H.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304-

Partnership

A:42 (2010)
Other Language: Retiring or
deceased partner entitled to the
value of his interest.

New Jersey LLC

N.J.REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B49 (LexisNexis 2008)

New Jersey

N.J.REV. STAT. ANN. §

Corporate

14A:12-7 (LexisNexis
2008)**
Allows for
marketability
discount; Balsamadies
v. Protameen
Chemicals, Inc., 734
A. 2d 721(N.J. 1999 ),
rev‘g 712 A. 2d
673(N.J. Super. App.
Div. 1998).
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New Jersey

N.J.REV. STAT. ANN. §

Partnership

42:1A-34 (2010)
Buyout at fair value as
of the date of
withdrawal based on
the right to share in
distributions from the
partnership unless the
partnership agreement
provides for a
different fair value
formula.

New Mexico LLC

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-40
(LexisNexis 2008)

New Mexico

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-16-16

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2008)

New Mexico

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-1A-701

Partnership

(LexisNexis 2009)
Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout greater of the
liquidation value or the
amount distributable to the
dissociating partner had the
partnership been sold as a
going concern without
dissociated partner.

New York LLC

N.Y.LT. LIAB. CO. LAW § 702
(LexisNexis 2008)

New York

N.Y. BUS. CORP. §§

Corporate

1104 & 1104A for
dissolution & §1118
for buy-out in lieu of
dissolution. **
Allows marketability
discount; Raskin v.
Walter Karl, Inc., 514
N.Y. S 2d 120 (N.Y.
App. 1987).
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New York

N.Y. PARTNERSHIP 73

Partnership

(LexisNexis 2010)

675

BUY-OUT AT
“FAIR VALUE”

Other Language: Retiring or
deceased partner entitled to the
value of his interest.
Note: See Vick v. Albert, 849
N.Y.S. 2d 250(App. Div.
2008) (minority and
marketability discounts
unavailable; buy out of retiring
partner doesn‘t raise same
issues as in corporate appraisal
statute).
North Carolina

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-6-02

LLC

(LexisNexis 2008)

North Carolina

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2008)

North Carolina

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-72

Partnership

(LexisNexis 2010)
Other Language: Retiring or
deceased partner entitled to the
value of his interest.

North Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE §

LLC

10-32-119
(LexisNexis 2008)
See also N.D. Cent.
Code §10-32-54
(LexisNexis 2008)
Provides Dissenters‘
Rights at fair value.

North Dakota

N.D.Cent. Code

Corporate

§ 10-19.1-115
(LexisNexis 2008)
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North Dakota

N.D.Cent. Code

Partnership

§ 45-19-01 (2010). Other
Language: Follows RUPA §
7.01. Buyout greater of the
liquidation value or the
amount distributable to the
dissociating partner had the
partnership been sold as a
going concern without
dissociated partner.

Ohio LLC

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1705.47 (LexisNexis 2008)
But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§1705.41(2008) Provides
Dissenters‘ Rights at fair cash
value.

Ohio Corporate

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.91 (LexisNexis 2008)

Ohio Partnership

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1776.54 (LexisNexis 2010)
Other Language:
Based on RUPA. Treated as if
partnership sold the assets at a
price equal to the greater of the
liquidation value or value
based on the sale of the entire
business as a going concern
without dissociated partner.

Oklahoma LLC

OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, ch. 14, §
2038 (LexisNexis 2008)

Oklahoma

OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, ch. 22, §

Corporate

1094 (LexisNexis 2008)

Oklahoma

OKLA. STAT. tit. 54, ch. 1, §

Partnership

1.701 (LexisNexis 2009)
Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout greater of the
liquidation value or the
amount distributable to the
dissociating partner had the
partnership been sold as a
going concern without
dissociated partner.

[Vol. 13:3

BUY-OUT AT
“FAIR VALUE”
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OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.661
(2007)

Oregon Corporate

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.661
(2007).

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §

Partnership

67.250 (LexisNexis
2009)
Departs from RUPA
Language:
Buyout price is an
amount equal to the
fair value of the
dissociated partner‘s
interest . . . If the
partner has a minority
interest . . . the buyout
price . . . shall not be
discounted.

Pennsylvania

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

LLC

§§ 8933 and 8972
(LexisNexis 2007)
Judicial dissolution
tied to not reasonably
practicable standard
but provides for
distribution at fair
value upon
dissociation from
LLC.

Pennsylvania

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1981

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2007)

Pennsylvania

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8364

Partnership

(LexisNexis 2009)
Other Language: Retiring or
deceased partner entitled to the
value of his interest.

Rhode Island LLC

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-40
(LexisNexis 2008)

Rhode Island

R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-

Corporate

1.2-1314 (LexisNexis
2008) & §7-1.2-1315
(LexisNexis 2008)**
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Rhode Island

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-12-53

Partnership

(LexisNexis 2010) Other

[Vol. 13:3

BUY-OUT AT
“FAIR VALUE”

Language: Retiring or
deceased partner entitled to the
value of his interest.
South Carolina

S. C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-801

LLC

(LexisNexis 2008) ****

South Carolina

S. C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2008)

South Carolina

S. C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-1080

Partnership

(LexisNexis 2009)
Other Language: Retiring or
deceased partner entitled to the
value of his interest.

South Dakota

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-

LLC

801(a)(4)(iv) (LexisNexis
2008)

South Dakota

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §

Corporate

47-1A-1430
(LexisNexis 2008) &
for purchase 47-1A1434 to 47-1A-1434.7
(LexisNexis 2008) **

South Dakota

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 48-7A-

Partnership

701 (LexisNexis 2009)

Tennessee LLC

TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-249-617
(LexisNexis 2008)
Authorizes judicial
dissolution and
TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-249-503 and 48249-506 (LexisNexis
2008) provide
guidelines as to
purchase (containing
valuation provisions at
fair value where a
member‘s interest has
been terminated).
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Tennessee

TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-24-301

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2008)

BUY-OUT AT “FAIR
MARKET VALUE” OR
CONTAINING OTHER
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE

Tennessee

TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-1-701

Partnership

(LexisNexis 2010)

679

BUY-OUT AT
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Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout greater of the
liquidation value or the
amount distributable to the
dissociating partner had the
partnership been sold as a
going concern without
dissociated partner.
Texas LLC

TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN. §
11.314 (LexisNexis 2007)

Texas Corporate
Texas Partnership

TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE
ANN. § 10.354
(LexisNexis 2010)
Uses ―fair value‖ in
Dissenters‘ rights
provision. Comment
indicates no
substantive change
was intended in
Dissenters‘ rights. See
also TEX. BUS. CORP.
ACT § 5.12 (2009) **
Provides payment to
dissenters based on
fair value without
consideration of
control premium,
minority discount, or
marketability
discount.
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UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2C1210 & 48-2C-1214
(LexisNexis 2008) Provision
to purchase in lieu of
dissolution at fair market
value.

Utah Corporate

UTAH CODE ANN. §
16-10a-1430
(LexisNexis 2008)
Provision to purchase
in lieu of dissolution
at fair value at 16-10a1434 (Lexis Nexis
2008). ** See also 1610a-1330.

Utah Partnership

UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-39
(LexisNexis 2010) Other
Language: Retiring or
deceased partner entitled to the
value of his interest.

Vermont LLC

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3101
(LexisNexis 2007)

Vermont

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A § 1430

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2007)

Vermont

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11

Partnership

§ 3261 (LexisNexis 2010)
Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout greater of the
liquidation value or the
amount distributable to the
dissociating partner had the
partnership been sold as a
going concern without
dissociated partner.

Virginia LLC

VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1047
(LexisNexis 2008)

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2008)
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Virginia

VA. CODE ANN. § 150-73-112

Partnership

(LexisNexis 2010) Other
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BUY-OUT AT
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Language: Follows RUPA §
7.01.
Buyout greater of the
liquidation value or the
amount distributable to the
dissociating partner had the
partnership been sold as a
going concern without
dissociated partner.
Washington LLC

WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.275
(LexisNexis 2008) But see §
25.15.430 (LexisNexis 2008)
Provides Dissenters‘ Rights at
fair value.

Washington

WASH. REV. CODE §

Corporate

23B.14.300 (LexisNexis 2008)

Washington

WASH. REV. CODE § 25.05.425

See also partnership

Partnership

(LexisNexis 2010)

dissenters‘ provisions

Other Language: Follows

requiring payment at

RUPA § 7.01.

―fair value‖ under §§

Buyout greater of the

25.05.420 - 25.05.475

liquidation value or the

(LexisNexis 2010).

amount distributable to the
dissociating partner had the
partnership been sold as a
going concern without
dissociated partner.
West Virginia

W.VA. CODE § 31B-1-

LLC

801(b)(5)(v) (LexisNexis 2008)

West Virginia

W.VA. CODE § 31D-

Corporate

14-1430 (LexisNexis
2008)
Provision for purchase
in lieu of dissolution
at § 31D-14-1434 **
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West Virginia

W.VA. CODE § 47B-7-1

Partnership

(LexisNexis 2009)
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Other Language: Follows
RUPA § 7.01.
Buyout greater of the
liquidation value or the
amount distributable to the
dissociating partner had the
partnership been sold as a
going concern without
dissociated partner.
Wisconsin LLC

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0902
(LexisNexis 2007)

Wisconsin

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1430

Corporate

(LexisNexis 2007)

Wisconsin

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 178.37

Partnership

(LexisNexis 2009)
Other Language: Retiring or
deceased partner entitled to the
value of his interest.

Wyoming LLC

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-701
(LexisNexis 2010) Authorizes
judicial dissolution but offers
no guidance on value.
However LLCs electing close
LLC status lack express
statutory authorization for
judicial dissolution. WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 17-25-103
(LexisNexis 2010)

Wyoming

WYO. STAT. ANN. §

Corporate

17-16-1430
(LexisNexis 2007)
Provision for purchase
in lieu of dissolution
at §17-16-1434
(LexisNexis 2007). **
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Wyoming

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-21-701

Partnership

(LexisNexis 2010)

683

BUY-OUT AT
“FAIR VALUE”

Supplements RUPA language,
providing for a buyout price
equal to the greater of the
amount that would have been
distributable if the assets were
sold at the greater of
liquidation value or the value
based on the sale as a going
concern, and indicating that in
either case, the sale price of
the partnership assets shall be
determined on the basis of the
amount that would be paid by
a willing buyer to a willing
seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell, and
with knowledge of all relevant
facts.

* Cf. Florida‘s LLC statutory appraisal rights at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.4351 (LexisNexis 2008) (disregarding expressly minority
or marketability discounts for LLCs with ten or fewer members
but providing no statutory guidance on valuation for LLCs with
more than ten members). Florida‘s corporate appraisal rights at
FLA. STAT. ANN. §608.1301 similarly require the minority and
marketability discounts to be disregarded for corporations with
ten or fewer shareholders, but remain silent on valuation for
corporations with more than ten shareholders.
** Election to purchase in lieu of dissolution.
*** Gives court discretion to provide remedies and one of the
remedies listed includes purchase at fair value.
**** Note that 33-44-701 contains provisions for purchasing a
member‘s interest at fair value.
***** Without reduction for minority discount or absent
extraordinary circumstances, without a discount for lack of
marketability.

